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ARTICLES

Democracy and Criminal Discovery
Reform After Connick and Garcetti
Janet Moore†
INTRODUCTION
The nondisclosure of information beneficial to criminal
defendants causes wrongful convictions, wasteful litigation,
and uncertainty in criminal adjudications.1 Prosecutors are
required to disclose this information under Brady v. Maryland2
and related cases,3 criminal discovery rules,4 and codes of
† Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. Email: janet.moore@uc.edu. I thank Deans Erwin Chemerinsky and Lou Bilionis,
Professors Bob Mosteller, Mark Godsey, R. Michael Cassidy, Ron Wright, Margaret
Tarkington, Jennifer Laurin, Daniel Medwed, Jack Chen, and faculty participants in
the College of Law’s Summer Workshop for very helpful responses to drafts of this
Article. Catherine Sakla, Lindsey Fleissner, Krista Johnson, and Anthony Robertson
provided outstanding research assistance. All errors are my own. As relevant to full
disclosure, my experience includes indigent capital defense litigation on Brady claims,
and criminal justice reform research and advocacy as a Soros Senior Justice Advocacy
Fellow, member of the Ohio Public Defender Commission, and Director of the Race and
Justice Project at the Ohio Justice & Policy Center.
1 Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 96 & tbl.5
(2008); Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction
Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 69-70 & n.173 (documenting cases); Peter A. Joy, The
Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping
Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 403-04 (citing studies); Emily M.
West, Innocence Project, Court Findings of Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims in PostConviction Appeals and Civil Suits Among the First 255 DNA Exoneration Cases 1 & n.1
(2010),
available
at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Innocence_Project_Pros_
Misconduct.pdf (citing studies); id. at 4-11 (sampling cases); N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, FINAL
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS 7-9, 19-44 (2009), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/
TaskForceonWrongfulConvictions/FinalWrongfulConvictionsReport.pdf.
2 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
3 See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421-22 (1995); United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679 (1985); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959); Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, reh’g
denied, 294 U.S. 732 (1935).
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professional ethics.5 But two recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, Connick v. Thompson6 and Garcetti v. Ceballos,7
underscore the weak enforceability of Brady-line authorities as
mechanisms for criminal discovery reform. The cases also point
out the contrasting fairness and efficiency of full open file
discovery8 as an alternative reform model.
Connick arose after John Thompson spent eighteen years
behind bars. For fourteen of those years, Thompson was on
twenty-three-hour-a-day solitary confinement in a six-by-nine
foot windowless death row cell at Angola Prison.9 A few weeks
before his scheduled execution, a last-ditch defense investigation
revealed what the Louisiana Court of Appeal described as the
prosecutors’ “intentional hiding of exculpatory evidence.”10 This
new information led to Thompson’s release.11 He then filed a
federal civil rights action.12 The federal jury awarded him $14
million in compensation for his wrongful imprisonment.13 The
4 See, e.g., Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Seek
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
1379, 1417 & n.206 (2000) (citing discovery rule provisions).
5 Of the abundant literature on the inadequacy of disciplinary codes to
regulate prosecutorial discovery violations, see Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s
Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 282-96 (2008);
Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1593-94;
Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute
Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 516-20 (2011); Kevin C. McMunigal,
The (Lack of) Enforcement of Prosecutor Disclosure Rules, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 847,
848-49 (2010); Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the
Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15
GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 264-85 (2008); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions
Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 716-31
(1987); Ellen Yaroshevsky, Wrongful Conviction: It Is Time to Take Prosecutor
Discipline Seriously, 8 D.C. L. REV. 275, 276-77 (2004); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A.
Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the
Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 11-13, 58-59 (2009). But see id. at 5-11
(arguing that prosecutors “rarely deserve exclusive or primary blame for the conviction
of innocent defendants” and urging more nuanced assessment of prosecutor’s role);
Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2127-37 (2010)
(arguing that the shift away from fault-based rhetoric encourages prosecutorial
cooperation with administrative reform).
6 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
7 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-903 to -910 (2012); id. § 15A-1415(f); see Mosteller,
supra note 5, at 307-16 (discussing fairness and efficiency enhancements under full
open file discovery statutes).
9 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355; Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 842-43,
865 (5th Cir. 2008), aff’d by divided en banc opinion, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009),
rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
10 State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 557 (La. Ct. App. 2002), rev. denied,
829 So. 2d 427 (La. 2002) (reversing order denying Thompson a new trial).
11 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 1355-56.
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jury found that Orleans Parish District Attorney Harry Connick
had been deliberately indifferent toward the need to train line
prosecutors on their Brady discovery duties.14
By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court ordered
Thompson’s award vacated and sharply restricted 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 as an avenue for enforcing prosecutors’ constitutional
disclosure duties.15 The Court had previously held individual
prosecutors immune from personal liability for failing to
conduct Brady training.16 Connick effectively immunizes
municipalities for those failures, eliminating the taxpaying and
voting public as a meaningful resource to compensate and deter
Brady violations. Writing for the dissent, Justice Ginsburg
cautioned that “prosecutorial concealment . . . is bound to be
repeated unless municipal agencies bear responsibility—made
tangible by § 1983 liability.”17
Connick illustrates the subordination of Brady
enforcement to other interests—here, a concern to limit
municipal liability, even when government employees confess to
intentional misconduct. Connick also highlights a similar
subordination of Brady enforcement by the same five-member
Supreme Court majority in Garcetti v. Ceballos.18 Richard
Ceballos’s civil rights case was in some respects the mirror image
of John Thompson’s. Ceballos was not a criminal defendant. He
was a Los Angeles prosecutor. He alleged that his supervisors
unconstitutionally retaliated against him not for withholding
beneficial information from the accused but for bringing such
evidence to light.19 In Garcetti, the majority held that the First
Amendment provides no protection against such retaliation.20
Connick was promptly condemned for restricting 42
U.S.C § 1983 as an avenue for enforcing Brady.21 But scholars
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1356, 1366.
16 Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 338-39 (2009). For a historical
critique of prosecutorial immunity doctrines in the civil rights setting, see Johns, supra
note 5, at 521-27. On the minimal utility of enforcing personal liability under section
1983, see Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in
Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 29-32 (2000).
17 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
18 See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
19 Id. at 416, 421-22.
20 Id. at 426.
21 See, e.g., Justice John Paul Stevens, Remarks at Equal Justice Initiative
Dinner (May 2, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/stevens.pdf; Susan
A. Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other Fictions: A
Comment on Connick v. Thompson, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 715 (2011); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Head in the Sand on Prosecutorial Misconduct, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 25, 2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202491215314&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
14
15
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have not unpacked Garcetti’s full significance on that point. In
part, this neglect is understandable. With few exceptions,22
Garcetti has been analyzed on its terms, as clarifying First
Amendment doctrine regarding government employee speech.23
Closer analysis reveals a previously unremarked due process
shield that should have protected Richard Ceballos from
retaliation for Brady compliance. At a deeper level, the silence
on Garcetti’s implications for constitutional criminal discovery is
emblematic of the short shrift often accorded to the enforcement
of prosecutors’ constitutional discovery obligations.
Taken together, the two cases neatly illustrate Brady’s
weak enforceability. By effectively eliminating municipal
liability even when prosecutors deliberately suppress evidence,
Connick gives a wink-and-nod to nondisclosure.24 By limiting
section 1983 protection against retaliation for good faith
compliance with discovery duties, Garcetti sends a chilling
message that prosecutors may be damned if they do disclose
beneficial evidence to the defense. By landing this one-two
punch against enforceability of Brady-line duties, Connick and
Garcetti invite a contrast with full open file discovery statutes
as the optimal strategy for increasing the fairness, finality, and
efficiency of criminal adjudications.
Among discovery reform statutes, North Carolina’s are
the most expansive in the nation. They mandate the
prosecution’s disclosure to the defense of all information
obtained in a criminal investigation.25 They require recordation
of oral statements26 and impose criminal penalties for willful
22 Margaret Tarkington, Government Speech and the Publicly Employed
Attorney, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2175, 2178-89 & nn.13, 46-57 (addressing due process
disclosure implications of Garcetti and responding to Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging
First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008)).
23 See id. at 2176 & n.5 (citing scholarly commentary).
24 Connick’s wink-and-nod was not undone by the terse majority opinion
granting Brady relief in the Orleans Parish case of Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630-31
(2012), nor by the remarkable suggestion during oral argument that the prosecutor
consider forfeiting the case. See Lyle Denniston, Disaster at the Lectern, SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov. 8, 2011, 4:51 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=131456. The governing doctrine
invited diverse views on the materiality of the undisclosed evidence, as was demonstrated
by Justice Thomas’s close analysis of the evidence, Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 631-41 (Thomas,
J., dissenting), by the state trial judge who rejected Smith’s Brady claim on the merits
after hearing witness testimony over the course of four days, Respondent’s Brief at 20,
Smith, 132 S. Ct. 627 (No. 10-8145), and by the numerous Louisiana appellate judges who
voted (apparently unanimously) to deny Smith’s petitions for discretionary review, see id.
and State v. Smith, 45 So. 3d 1065 (La. 2010). For discussion of the practical and
doctrinal problems that lead to such disparate assessments of Brady-line duties, see infra
Part II.
25 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1)(a) (2012).
26 Id. § 15A-903(a)(1)(c).
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violations.27 Available empirical evidence shows significant
success in the statutes’ implementation and expansion, yet full
open file discovery remains a rarity in the United States.28 And
like the precise due process disclosure duty at issue in Garcetti,
this cutting-edge development in criminal procedure has
received scant scholarly attention.
The silence may result in part from a trend, expressed in
Marc Miller and Ronald Wright’s The Black Box,29 which
privileges internal bureaucratic improvement over litigation and
legislation as the only effective avenue toward criminal justice
reform—at least with respect to prosecutors’ discretionary
decision making. Full open file discovery reform bolsters
skepticism toward that trend. Dogged case investigation and
litigation raised the profile of criminal discovery issues for the
public, the media, and key legislators. Increased public scrutiny
led to hard-fought political compromises in the enactment and
amendment of the reform statutes.
Full open file reform vindicates law and politics as
effective strategies—complementary to internal agency
reform—for increasing transparency and accountability in
prosecutorial decision making. Broader attention and closer
study, ideally through the full open file statutes’ evaluation as
a model for uniform legislation, should raise discovery reform
to parity with other criminal procedure reforms. Comparable
initiatives include improvements in eyewitness identification
protocols, in the testing and retention of forensic evidence, and
in interrogation methods.30 This article fills an important
analytical gap by focusing closely on the litigation and
legislation that drove full open file discovery reform, and by
proposing that the Connick-Garcetti one-two punch against
enforcing discovery duties can and should energize nationwide
efforts to obtain full open file reform.
Id. § 15A-903(d).
For examples of other relatively broad criminal discovery provisions, see
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01 (2010); N.J. COURT R. 3:13-3(a)-(c) (2011).
29 Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125,
128-30 (2008).
30 See, e.g., UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT
(2010), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/erci/2010final.htm; David
Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1027, 1046-47 & nn.136-38 (2010) (citing examples of reform legislation in Illinois
and Wisconsin); Sub. S.B. 77, 128th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2009) (establishing DNA
database, requiring recordation of interrogations, and revising eyewitness
identification procedures by enacting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.561, 2933.81-83,
2953.56-60 and amending id. §§ 109.573, 2901.07, 2953.21, 2953.23, 2953.31, 2953.32,
2953.321, 2953.35, 2953.51, 2953.54, 2953.55, 2953.71-79, 2953.81, 2953.83, 2953.84).
27
28

1334

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:4

Parts I and II set the stage for in-depth examinations of
Connick and Garcetti as examples of Brady’s weak
enforceability and for discussion of the litigation and legislation
that generated the full open file reform alternative. Part I
excavates the roots of due process discovery doctrine to identify
core meanings and principles. Part II summarizes intractable
doctrinal and practical problems that weaken enforceability of
constitutional criminal discovery rights and duties. Part III
examines Connick and Garcetti as recent exemplars of those
problems. Part IV contrasts Connick and Garcetti as examples of
the Brady regime’s complexity and costs with the simplicity and
efficiency of full open file discovery. This part surveys reported
case law, available legislative history, and observations from some
frontline participants as the most readily accessible evidence of
full open file discovery’s implementation and expansion.
Forthcoming research identifies conditions that enable
such reform in some jurisdictions and impede it in others. But
the story of full open file discovery reform recasts the core lesson
of Connick and Garcetti. The cases need not reinforce despair of
litigation and legislation as strategies for sustainable system
improvement. They can introduce a new chapter in a broader
reform story. Their holdings underscore Brady’s weak
enforceability and its intolerable results in wasted lives,
tramped liberty, and squandered criminal justice resources.
Connick and Garcetti should motivate broad adoption of full
open file discovery statutes as a prerequisite—a necessary,
although not sufficient condition—for improving efficiency,
fairness, and finality in the resolution of criminal cases.
I.

DUE PROCESS DISCLOSURE DUTIES

Brady doctrine requires prosecutors to disclose certain
beneficial information to the defense.31 It is helpful to excavate
the historical roots of these duties, if only to counteract
shorthand citations that elide or misstate core principles and
holdings of Brady-line cases.32 Due process discovery duties are
Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012).
See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1378-82 (2011) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (citing Orleans Parish prosecutors’ admitted ignorance of core Bradyline discovery duties); see also Cookie Ridolfi, New Perspectives on Brady and Other
Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices: External
Regulation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 2030 n.83 (2010) (distinguishing Brady duties
from ethics rules on the basis that the latter require no defense request to trigger
disclosure duty); but see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (eliminating
defense request requirement from due process discovery doctrine). In designing and
31
32
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grounded in the prosecutorial mandate to speak truth33 and
seek justice.34 The duties encompass two types of evidence. The
first tends to reduce the defendant’s culpability with respect to
guilt or sentencing.35 Examples include witness statements
that corroborate an alibi defense.36 The second category
comprises impeachment evidence. A deal between a witness
and a prosecutor to exchange testimony for leniency on a
pending charge, for example, may support an inference that the
witness is less credible due to pro-prosecution bias.37
The history of due process discovery doctrine also
reveals a handful of principles through which the core
meanings of truth-speaking and justice-seeking are to be
implemented. For example, there is no mens rea element in a
Brady claim. Prosecutors must disclose favorable evidence
whether or not defense counsel requests it.38 Defendants need
not prove prosecutors’ acts or omissions were undertaken
intentionally or in bad faith.39 Another core principle requires
cumulative prejudice review. Courts must assess harm from
nondisclosure by reviewing the strength and weakness of all
evidence presented by both parties at trial and in
postconviction proceedings.40
These core principles of Brady doctrine began to emerge
in 1935, when Thomas Mooney obtained Supreme Court review
of his capital murder case.41 Mooney was a workers’ rights
activist. He was sentenced to death in 1917 for a San Francisco
bombing that killed ten people.42 Mooney fought his conviction
for eighteen years before the Supreme Court accepted his
petition for federal habeas review. In Mooney v. Holohan, the
Court held—for the first time—that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids prosecutors from
implementing training programs for defense counsel, I have often found comparable
misunderstanding or misstatement of criminal discovery rights and duties.
33 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959).
34 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
35 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: POSTINVESTIGATION 425 (2d ed. 2009).
36 Id.
37 For thoughtful analysis of the duty to disclose impeachment evidence, see
R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of
Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1431 (2011).
38 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
39 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
40 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439-40 (1995).
41 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam).
42 Lori A. Ringhand, Aliens on the Bench: Lessons in Identity, Race and
Politics from the First “Modern” Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing to Today, 2010
MICH. ST. L. REV. 795, 805 & n.56.
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obtaining convictions through the knowing use of perjured
testimony.43 The constitutional values at issue were fairness
and reliability in contests between concentrated government
power and the individual.44
A few months later, the Court decided Berger v. United
45
States. This mine-run counterfeiting case contains oft-cited
descriptions of the prosecution’s unique purpose and power and
the corresponding primacy of prosecutors’ duties to speak truth
and seek justice. Under Berger, the prosecutor is a minister of
government and “servant of the law.”46 The prosecution’s
interest “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.”47 The prosecution must ensure that “guilt shall not
escape nor innocence suffer.”48 It is as much the prosecutor’s
duty “to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one.”49 This is so, the Court reasoned,
because the fact finder in a criminal case reasonably expects
the prosecutor to abide by the foregoing high principles.
Therefore, evidence and arguments bearing a prosecutor’s
imprimatur weigh strongly against the defendant.50
In a key doctrinal development, the Berger Court
assessed prejudice cumulatively. Berger alleged that the
prosecutor in his case had violated his due process rights in
several ways. Instead of addressing each allegation piecemeal,
the Court held that the prosecutor’s misstatements of fact,
insinuations of facts not in evidence, and other “pronounced
and persistent” misconduct, taken together, rendered the
proceedings unfair and required a new trial.51 Berger’s
43 Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112-13. The Court sent the case back to state court for
exhaustion of the new due process claim. Id. at 115. Despite pleas on Mooney’s behalf
from Felix Frankfurter via President Wilson, the California governor refused to order a
new trial. Mooney spent four more years in prison. He was released the same week
that Frankfurter was appointed to the Supreme Court. Frankfurter’s intervention on
Mooney’s behalf was cited against him during his confirmation hearings through, inter
alia, a letter from Theodore Roosevelt deriding Frankfurter’s “besmirching the
reputation of God-fearing, patriotic Americans . . . destroying respect for law and order,
and coddling anarchist[s], bomb throwers, and cowards.” Ringhand, supra note 42, at
805 & n.56 (citing MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE
REFORM YEARS 99 (1982)).
44 Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112-15.
45 295 U.S. 78, 78 (1935).
46 Id. at 88.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 89; see Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1, 4 (2005) (per curiam)
(interpreting Berger’s holding as sounding in due process).
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cumulative-prejudice analysis has remained a core component
of constitutional criminal discovery doctrine.52
In addition to Mooney and Berger, a third major due
process discovery case emerged in 1935. That year a Kansas
jury convicted Harry Pyle of a terrible series of crimes involving
murder, torture, and theft.53 Despite the heinous nature of these
offenses,54 the Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in Pyle v.
Kansas opened the door to a significant expansion in
constitutional criminal discovery rights and duties.55
The Court held that Pyle’s “inexpertly drawn” but
unrefuted pro se habeas petition required a hearing on claims that
prosecutors convicted him through the knowing use of perjured
testimony.56 That holding was consistent with Mooney, but the
Court went further. Pyle articulated a separate and distinct claim
that prosecutors engaged in “the deliberate suppression . . . of
evidence favorable to him” beyond the facts relating to the
allegedly perjured testimony.57 Citing Mooney, the Court held that
Pyle’s claims, if proved, would require his release.58
The Court applied the Pyle “favorable evidence” rule
fifteen years later in another per curiam opinion. In Alcorta v.
Texas, a capital case, the Court granted a pro se petition for
certiorari, stayed execution, and reversed the Texas courts’
denials of postconviction relief.59 The reason: the prosecutor
had suppressed evidence that Alcorta could have used to
impeach a key state witness.60 Napue v. Illinois followed
Alcorta by imposing a due process duty on the prosecution to
correct testimony that is known to be false, even when the
evidence is not directly exculpatory and instead can be used to
See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439-40 (1995).
Kansas v. Pyle, 57 P.2d 93, 96-98 (Kan. 1936).
54 The murder victim’s brother committed suicide after testifying against
Pyle, “apparently because of the aftereffects of the torture” the defendants had inflicted
upon him. Id. at 98.
55 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942).
56 Id. at 215-16.
57 Id. (emphasis added).
58 Id. at 216. On remand, the Kansas Supreme Court found no evidence of
perjury or suppression of favorable evidence. Pyle v. Amrine, 156 P.2d 509, 521 (Kan.
1945). Pyle’s son was pardoned in 1959 after his conviction for these crimes. Alvin
Dumler, Mass Murder Happened Before in Southwest Kansas, HUTCHINSON NEWS (Kan.),
Nov. 22, 1959, at 2, available at http://hutchnews.com/www/clutterpdfs/cluttermurdersday7-othermassmurders.pdf. But Bedau and Radelet appear mistaken in stating that
“Pyle was released.” Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 153 & n. 791 (1987) (citing Pyle, 317 U.S.
at 214); see also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 190-93 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(compiling and discussing criticisms of Bedau-Radelet study).
59 355 U.S. 28, 28-32 (1957) (per curiam).
60 Id. at 30-32.
52
53
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challenge the credibility of a prosecution witness.61 The Napue
Court reasoned, “A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and,
if it is in any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has
the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false
and elicit the truth.”62
Brady v. Maryland63 became the eponymous due process
discovery case by building on the core meanings developed from
Mooney and Pyle through Alcorta and Napue.64 First, Brady
clarified prosecutors’ due process duty to disclose evidence
favorable to the defense that is “material to guilt or
punishment.”65 A second key Brady holding rendered
prosecutors’ good or bad faith regarding nondisclosure
irrelevant.66 Initial refinements of these two holdings focused
on the elusive definition of materiality.
Brady arose after the defendant was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death.67 He later learned that his
codefendant had confessed to committing the murder.68 The
Court held the new evidence material to Brady’s defense. But
the Court did not order a new trial. Instead, the Court ordered
resentencing and gave some hints about the meaning of
materiality in due process discovery doctrine.69 A key fact was
Brady’s own confession to complicity in the murder.70 The
Court reasoned that, in light of Brady’s confession, the
undisclosed evidence would have been unlikely to alter the
jury’s verdict on Brady’s guilt.71 In contrast, the Court held,
evidence of shared culpability between the codefendants could
have affected jurors’ views on Brady’s eligibility for the death
sentence.72

360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959).
Id. The prosecutor elicited the same lie on redirect examination. Instead of
holding the elicitation of that perjured testimony an independent due process violation
under Mooney, the Court, instead, took it as proof of prejudice from the due process
violation that occurred when the prosecutor suppressed the truth during crossexamination. The prosecutor proved the lie’s significance, the Court held, by
deliberately eliciting the same lie on redirect. Id.
63 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
64 Id. at 87.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 84.
68 Id. at 87.
69 Id. at 87-88.
70 See id. at 84.
71 Id. at 89.
72 Id. at 88-91. The state resentenced Brady to life eight years later. Brady v.
Superintendent, Anne Arundel Cnty. Detention Ctr., 443 F.2d 1307, 1309-10 (4th Cir. 1971).
61
62
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After Brady, the Court clarified that due process
disclosure duties encompass all material impeachment
evidence.73 But the Court took another twenty-two years to
define the term material. In crafting that definition in United
States v. Bagley,74 the Court borrowed from new jurisprudence
governing the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel. Bagley grafted the prejudice definition from the
ineffective assistance test onto due process doctrine governing
prosecutors’ duty to disclose evidence beneficial to the
defense.75 Therefore, to prove that undisclosed evidence is
material, defendants must show “a reasonable probability” of a
different result in the case had the undisclosed evidence been
available to the defense.76 A “reasonable probability [is] a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.”77
A decade passed before the next significant refinement in
due process disclosure doctrine. In Kyles v. Whitley,78 the Court
undertook a detailed assessment of the alleged disclosure
violations. Such detail was necessary, according to the
concurring Justices, because prosecutors serving under Orleans
Parish District Attorney Harry Connick, Sr. committed “blatant
and repeated violations of a well-settled constitutional
obligation” to reveal favorable evidence.79 Ordering a new trial,80
the Court clarified due process disclosure doctrine in several
important ways. First, Kyles expanded on the key Brady holding
that prosecutors’ good or bad faith regarding undisclosed
evidence is irrelevant.81 Kyles reiterated the longstanding
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
473 U.S. 667 (1985).
75 Id. at 682-83 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 664, 668 (1984)).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 682. In another key holding, Bagley eliminated the “demand”
requirement of Brady’s due process discovery doctrine, imposing a disclosure duty upon
prosecutors even in the absence of any defense request for the information. Id.
78 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
79 Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring). Kyles’s first trial ended in a hung jury. His
second trial began on December 6, 1984 and ended in his conviction and death sentence.
Petitioner’s Brief at *2, Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (No. 93-7927) [hereinafter
Kyles Pet. Br.]. On the same morning that Kyles’s second trial began, Raymond T. Liuzza,
Jr., “son of a prominent New Orleans business executive,” was murdered in front of his
home. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1371 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). John
Thompson was convicted and sentenced to death for Liuzza’s murder. Id. at 1374.
Thompson’s trial, like Kyles’s, took less than three days, including death-qualification of
the jury, the guilt/innocence phase, and the sentencing phase. Compare Kyles Pet. Br. at
*6 (trial completed December 6-8, 1984), with Petitioner’s Brief at 12, Connick, 131 S. Ct.
1350 (No. 09-571) (trial completed May 6-8, 1985).
80 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421.
81 Id. at 433, 437-38.
73
74
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principle that prosecutors are responsible for disclosing evidence
in their own files as well as evidence held by other prosecutors in
the same office.82 But Kyles also explained that prosecutors must
obtain and disclose evidence held by case investigators that is
materially beneficial to the defense, whether or not prosecutors
know the evidence exists.83
Kyles retained Berger’s cumulative-prejudice principle.84
But Kyles also focused closely on the link between the Brady due
process materiality test and the Sixth Amendment prejudice test
for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v.
Washington.85 There are three critical components of this
doctrinal link. First, the defendant’s burden to prove a
“reasonable probability” of a different outcome is less than a
preponderance of the evidence.86 Putting the familiar
preponderance test in the Brady context, defendants need not
advance the prejudice ball past the fifty-yard line; they do not
have to show that it is more likely than not that the cumulative
effect of the undisclosed evidence would have led to a different
verdict.87
Kyles also clarified the distinction between Brady
materiality and Strickland prejudice, on one hand, and the test
for sufficiency of the evidence, on the other.88 The latter test is
governed by Jackson v. Virginia.89 Under Jackson, the defense
must prove that no reasonable juror would vote for conviction
when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution.90 The Kyles Court held that the demanding
Jackson standard is inappropriately onerous, in the context of
prosecutors’ due process duties, to ensuring that defendants
receive fair trials resulting in verdicts that reliably warrant
public (and judicial) confidence.91 In the constitutional
discovery and ineffective assistance settings, therefore, courts
must weigh the strength and weakness of all the evidence that
is presented by both parties in both the trial and postconviction
proceedings.92
Id. at 432-37.
Id. at 437; see also Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869-70
(2006) (police suppression of exculpatory evidence violates Brady).
84 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436.
85 Id. at 437.
86 Id. at 434-35.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).
90 Id.
91 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38.
92 Id. at 434-35 & n.8.
82
83
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Finally, Kyles emphasized the significant responsibility
that accompanies prosecutors’ authority to make discretionary
decisions about disclosing Brady-line evidence. The Court
cautioned that “a prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to
the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence.”93
II.

DUE PROCESS TAKES A DIVE

New Orleans prosecutors did not “tack[] too close to the
wind”94 in John Thompson’s case. They sank the ship. The
Louisiana Court of Appeal concluded that Orleans Parish
prosecutors put Thompson on death row through the “intentional
hiding of exculpatory evidence.”95 That evidence, when unearthed
by a determined defense investigator, contributed to dismissal
and acquittal on the robbery and murder charges, respectively,
that the prosecutors had used to seek Thompson’s execution.96
Thompson’s case is one of many in which nondisclosure
of exculpatory evidence imposed unnecessary harm.97 Criminal
discovery reform is necessary because the constitutional
disclosure duties traced in Part I suffer from limited scope and
weak enforceability.98 Noncompliance and significant system
costs are the predictable results. To cite examples from John
Thompson’s jurisdiction alone, numerous reported Brady cases
from Harry Connick’s tenure as Orleans Parish District
Attorney involved prosecutors failing to disclose evidence to the
93 Id. at 439. Kyles spent more than a decade on Louisiana’s death row before
the Supreme Court ordered a new trial. Id. at 421. After three subsequent trials ended in
hung juries, Connick’s office dismissed the charges. JED HORNE, DESIRE STREET: A TRUE
STORY OF DEATH AND DELIVERANCE IN NEW ORLEANS 317-21 (2005). In July 2010, Kyles
was charged with the first-degree murder and second-degree kidnapping of Crystal St.
Pierre, arising from an alleged dispute over the value of a food stamp card. See Alan
Powell II, Curtis Kyles May Have Killed Woman over Food Stamp Card, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(July
7,
2010,
4:18
PM),
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/07/
curtis_kyles_may_have_killed_w.html; see also If Kyles Killed . . ., JEDHORNE.COM,
http://jedhorne.com/2010/06/did-kyles-kill/ (last visited July 3, 2011).
94 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439.
95 State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 557-58 (La. Ct. App.) (reversing order
denying Thompson a new trial), rev. denied, 829 So. 2d 427 (La. 2002).
96 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1355 (2011).
97 See supra note 1; see infra note 100.
98 There
is near unanimity among courts and commentators that
enforceability of Brady-line disclosure duties has remained problematic from the
outset. Johns, supra note 5, at 516-21; Daniel Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533 (2010); Ridolfi, supra note 32, at 2030-31 (existing disclosure
rules “are not doing enough because they are inadequate and sometimes not enforced
at all”); Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship
Toward the Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129 (Carol Steiker
ed., 2006). For an expression of judicial frustration with the development of Brady
doctrine, see United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1309-11 (3d Cir. 1984).

1342

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:4

defense for timely use at trial.99 Discovery violations required
new trials in seventeen of those cases.100 In the most recent case,
Smith v. Cain, the Court vacated a quintuple-murder
conviction.101
Such statistics, and the associated inefficiencies and
unfairness, result from inherent flaws in the governing
doctrine and from practical realities confronting those charged
with implementation. At the doctrinal level, the first critical
weakness is Brady’s mistaken assumption that prosecutors are
as well equipped as defense attorneys to recognize the
exculpatory or impeachment value of particular pieces of
evidence. Second, Brady’s built-in materiality prejudice
standard requires prosecutors to assess, ex ante, a question that
often can be answered only ex post: whether the cumulative
99 Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630-31 (2012); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 421 (1995); Mahler v. Kaylo, 537 F.3d 494, 503 (5th Cir. 2008); Crawford v Cain,
248 F. App’x 500, 504-07 (5th Cir. 2007); Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355, 1360 (5th Cir.
1994); Monroe v. Blackburn, 748 F.2d 958, 959-60 (5th Cir. 1984); Davis v. Heyd, 479
F.2d 446, 453 (5th Cir. 1973); Perez v. Cain, No. 04-1905, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1660,
at *59-64 (E.D. La. 2008); Sholes v. Cain, No. 06-1831, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99960, at
*33-34 (E.D. La. 2007); Joseph v. Whitley, No. 92-2335, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17385,
at *5-12 (E.D. La. 1992); Brown v. Donnelly, No. 89-4062, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13155, at *21-26 (E.D. La. 1990); State v. Bright, 875 So. 2d 37, 44 (La. 2004); State v.
Kemp, 828 So. 2d 540, 546 (La. 2002); State v. Marshall; 660 So. 2d 819, 827 (La. 1995);
State v. Knapper, 579 So. 2d 956, 961 (La. 1991); State v. Rosiere, 488 So. 2d 965, 97071 (La. 1986); State v. Perkins, 423 So. 2d 1103, 1107-08 (La. 1982); State v. Curtis,
384 So. 2d 396, 397 (La. 1980); State v. Falkins, 356 So. 2d 415, 416-19 (La. 1978);;
State v. Carney, 334 So. 2d 415, 419 (La. 1976); State of LA In the Interest of L.V., 66
So. 3d 558, 561-62; (La. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Jones, No. 2008-KA-0516, 2009 La.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 214, at *24-45 (La. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Goodwin, 881 So. 2d
1229, 1235-36 (La. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Lindsey, 844 So. 2d 961, 963-70 (La. Ct.
App. 2003); State v. Collins, 826 So. 2d 598, 611-12 (La. Ct. App. 2002); State v.
Nightengale, 818 So. 2d 819, 824-25 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Thompson, 825 So. 2d at 55758; State v. Lee, 778 So. 2d 656, 667 (La. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Moore, 777 So. 2d
600, 605-06 (La. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Major, 708 So. 2d 813, 817-18 (La. Ct. App.
1998); State v. Grubbs, 644 So. 2d 1105, 1110-11 (La. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Duncan,
648 So. 2d 1090, 1099-1100 (La. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Wolfe, 630 So. 2d 872, 879-80
(La. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Dozier, 553 So. 2d 931, 933 (La. Ct. App. 1989); State v.
Walter, 514 So. 2d 620, 621-22 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
100 Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 630-31; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421; Mahler, 537 F.3d at
503; Monroe, 607 F.2d at 152-53; Davis, 479 F.2d at 453; Perez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1660, at *59-64; Bright, 875 So. 2d at 44; Knapper, 579 So. 2d at 961; Rosiere, 488 So.
2d at 970-71; Perkins, 423 So. 2d at 1107-08; Curtis, 384 So. 2d at 397; Falkins, 356 So.
2d at 416-19; Carney, 334 So. 2d at 419; Lindsey, 844 So. 2d at 969-70; Kemp, 828 So.
2d at 546; Thompson, 825 So. 2d at 557-58; Lee, 778 So. 2d at 667; In State v. Parker,
361 So. 2d 226, 227 (La. 1978), the Court ordered a new trial because it was impossible
to reconstruct the record in order to litigate the Brady claim on appeal; the defendant
then withdrew the appeal.
101 132 S. Ct. at 630. By an 8-1 vote, the majority tersely rejected Justice
Thomas’s conclusion, based on a detailed assessment of the evidence, that the
defendant failed to satisfy Brady’s materiality standard. Instead, the Court
emphasized conflicts between the pretrial statements and trial testimony of the lone
eyewitness to link the defendant to the murders.
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impact of evidence beneficial to the defense would have created
a reasonable possibility of a different result if it had been
disclosed to the defense in time to be used during the
investigation and litigation of the original proceeding.102
The two flaws are linked. From some perspectives,
Brady’s materiality test imposes upon prosecutors as much a
duty of divination as disclosure.103 Cognitive phenomena such
as tunnel vision, groupthink, confirmation bias, and avoidance
of cognitive dissonance raise additional psychosocial barriers to
Brady compliance.104 These pervasive, unconscious patterns of
cognition can trump even the best of prosecutorial intentions.
Brady’s enforceability took another hit at the doctrinal
level when the Supreme Court shrank law enforcement’s
constitutional duties to investigate and retain exculpatory
information. Investigators have no due process duty to
investigate information that helps the defense.105 Although
prosecutors are responsible for obtaining Brady information
from their investigative agents,106 officers can destroy potentially
exculpatory evidence with impunity unless a defendant can

102 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (“[T]he prosecution, which alone can know what is
undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net
effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of [materiality] is
reached.”); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) (“[T]he significance of an
item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is
complete.”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682
(1985); see Cassidy, supra note 37, at 1437-45.
103 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439 (“[T]he character of a piece of evidence as favorable
will often turn on the context of the existing or potential evidentiary record.”).
104 Mosteller, supra note 5, at 309-12; Alafair S. Burke, Improving
Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1587, 1602-12 (2006); Ronald F. Wright, New Perspectives on Brady and Other
Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Group on Best Practices: Systems and
Culture, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1995-2010 (2010).
105 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979). Several circuits have
distinguished Baker. See Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 498-99 (6th Cir. 2009) (arresting
officer must consider both “inculpatory and exculpatory evidence” in determining
whether there is probable cause to arrest); Russo v. City of Bridgeport, No. 05-4302-CV,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16171, at *23-30 (2d Cir. Feb. 27), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 818 (2007)
(allowing civil rights claim to proceed under Fourth Amendment where arresting officers
detained plaintiff while failing to investigate readily available exculpatory evidence)
(collecting cases and correcting Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2007));
see also Fisher, supra note 4, at 1399-1401 (describing police duty to investigate
exculpatory evidence under England’s “tough on crime” Criminal Procedure and
Investigation Act 1996, ch. 25 (Eng.)).
106 Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869-70 (2006) (per curiam)
(“Brady suppression occurs when the government fails to turn over even evidence that
is ‘known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.’” (quoting Kyles, 514
U.S. at 438)). On remand, the West Virginia Supreme Court ordered a new trial over
heated dissents. State v. Youngblood, 650 S.E.2d 119, 132-33 (W. Va. 2007) (Davis,
C.J.); id. at 134-36 (Benjamin, J., dissenting); id. at 137-40 (Maynard, J., dissenting).

1344

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:4

prove bad faith.107 At a practical level, when law enforcement
does obtain and preserve Brady evidence, economic realities
undercut the enforceability of prosecutors’ constitutional
disclosure duties. Heavy caseloads create an independent
hurdle to compliance, as prosecutors are charged with
identifying and disclosing Brady material held by all
prosecutorial staff and their agents, including law
enforcement.108 Political pressure can be a factor as well.
Prosecutorial elections are often dominated by “tough on crime”
ideologies, which tend to be unsympathetic toward procedures
that help defendants avoid or reduce punishment.109
Brady’s enforceability sustained another blow when the
Supreme Court declined to impose a due process duty to
disclose impeachment evidence at the plea-bargaining stage,
where the overwhelming majority of cases are resolved.110 The
Court also held that the right to Brady material does not apply
in the specialized pretrial setting of the grand jury hearing.111
At the postconviction stage, the same five-member majority
common to Connick and Garcetti rejected a claim that due
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988).
Youngblood, 547 U.S. at 869-70. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the
question whether law enforcement officers may face civil liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for deliberately suppressing or otherwise failing to disclose Brady material. For
a canvassing of divided opinions on this issue in the federal courts of appeals, see
Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 377-81 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 3504 (2010); id. at 401-04 (Kethledge, J., dissenting in part); see also Smith v.
Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that police may face liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)); Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial
Disequilibration in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 101632, 1062-65 (2010) (analyzing Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1991)). For a
discussion of “Brady” lists, which target law enforcement officers for discipline when
they fail to provide prosecutors with exculpatory and impeachment evidence, see Nazir v.
Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-06546 SVW (AGRx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26820 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 2, 2011) (prosecutor’s office shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity from
lawsuit by officer fired for nondisclosure of Brady evidence); Walters v. Cnty. of Maricopa,
No. CV 04-1920-PHX-NVW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006)
(describing “Brady list” policy); Christopher N. Osher, Denver Cops’ Credibility Problems
Not Always Clear to Defenders, Juries, DENVER POST (July 10, 2011, 1:00 AM),
http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_18448755#ixzz1Rv2c57Iu (identifying “one out of
every 17 Denver police officers as having discipline issues serious enough that their
courtroom testimony may be suspect” and describing debate over effectiveness of
procedures for notifying defense lawyers of such issues).
109 ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 166-69 & 232 n.15 (2007) (citing examples); Wright, supra note 104, at
1999-2000 (noting potential “good or bad” influences of politics on disclosure decisions);
Daniel Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision and the
Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2201-05 (2010) (describing internal
and external pressures on prosecutorial decision making, including relationships with
police, victims, and electorate).
110 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
111 United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
107
108
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process imposes an independent duty to produce evidence that
can prove a defendant’s innocence, beyond the duty imposed by
state statutes governing access to such evidence.112 As a
practical matter, the majority of convicted defendants who are
indigent lack access to counsel and other resources needed to
investigate and litigate Brady claims.113 Thus, there is “little
reason for these violations ever to come to light.”114
The majority of postconviction Brady claims do not
succeed, often because courts hold that undisclosed information
was either immaterial115 or available to the defense through a
reasonable investigation.116 Habeas jurisprudence combined with
the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
heightened procedural hurdles to federal judicial review of statecourt Brady claims.117 Finally, even before the five-member
Supreme Court majority restricted § 1983 liability in Connick and
112 Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct.
2308, 2319-20 (2009). But see Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011) (allowing due
process challenge to implementation of Texas DNA testing procedures).
113 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (no federal constitutional
right to counsel in state post-conviction); Bruce Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors
About Their Disclosure Obligations: Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from Their Lawyers’
Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2175-76 & n.68 (2010) (describing limited access to
resources). Some courts have held that, by definition, anything available to the defense
through reasonable investigation is not Brady evidence. Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551,
560 (5th Cir. 1997); Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 975 n.4 (4th Cir. 1995). On the
chronic underfunding of defense investigative training and support, see THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 93-95 (2009); see also Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting
the Innocent: Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea
for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 959-73 (2010) (critiquing proposals to ration
service and absorb defense investigative function into law enforcement, prosecutorial,
judicial, and forensic science functions in Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense
Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1590,
1613-45 (2005), and Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An
Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 801 (2004)).
114 Green, supra note 113, at 2175 n.68 (citing, inter alia, United States v.
Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 172 (D. Mass. 2009) (reported cases cannot measure scope
of disclosure violations); United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1994)
(confessing “the nagging concern that material favorable to the defense may never
emerge from secret government files”)).
115 See, e.g., supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
116 Rector, 120 F.3d at 560 (“evidence is not ‘suppressed’ if the defendant
either knew, or should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take
advantage of any exculpatory evidence” (citing West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1399
(5th Cir. 1996))); Barnes, 58 F.3d at 975 & n.4 (“Brady requires that the government
disclose only evidence that is not available to the defense from other sources, either
directly or through diligent investigation”); United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d 911, 918
(2d Cir. 1993) (“Evidence is not ‘suppressed’ if the defendant either knew, or should
have known, of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory
evidence.” (citations omitted)). Under this analysis, defendants must plead alternative
ineffective assistance claims based on failure to investigate.
117 Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the
Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 98-104 (2012).
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Garcetti,118 judicially imposed doctrines of absolute and qualified
immunity rendered civil rights litigation nearly useless as a
mechanism for enforcing due process disclosure duties.119
The foregoing doctrinal and practical limitations
seriously weaken the enforceability of prosecutors’ due process
disclosure duties. The next section focuses closely on the
Connick and Garcetti cases as recent exemplars of the resulting
inefficiency, uncertainty, and unfairness in the processing of
criminal cases. Part IV contrasts the flawed Brady model with
the relative simplicity and efficiency of full open file discovery.
Highlighting the vitality of law and politics in this cutting-edge
reform initiative, Part IV urges that the contrast between the
two models should motivate broad enactment of full open file
reform across jurisdictions.
III.

DUE PROCESS SUBMERGED

Connick and Garcetti are linked in their subordination
of prosecutors’ constitutional discovery duties to other
interests, including the protection of municipalities from
financial liability for prosecutors’ acts and omissions regarding
Brady material. Analyzing the link between the two cases
requires close scrutiny of their distinctive facts, procedural
posture, and judicial reasoning. Subsections A and B focus on
Connick v. Thompson. The more doctrinally complex Garcetti
case is analyzed in Subsections C through E.
A.

Connick v. Thompson: “Egregious” and “Intentional”
Misconduct in Orleans Parish

John Thompson was twenty-two years old when he and
codefendant Kevin Freeman were arrested for the murder of
Raymond T. Liuzza, Jr., in New Orleans.120 Liuzza was shot to
death in early December, 1984, during a robbery outside his
home.121 “Because Liuzza was the son of a prominent executive,
See discussion infra Part III.
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 339 (2009) (absolute immunity
from personal liability for failure to train on Brady duties); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 420 (1976).
120 Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 843, 865 (5th Cir. 2008). Thompson
and Freeman were linked to Liuzza’s death by Richard Perkins, who approached
Liuzza’s family after a reward was offered. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1371
(2011). Perkins alleged that Thompson sold the murder weapon and Liuzza’s ring to a
man named David Harris. State v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d. 349, 351 (La. 1987).
121 Thompson, 516 So. 2d. at 351.
118
119
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the murder received a lot of attention.”122 Three weeks after
Liuzza’s murder, the three children of a man named LaGarde
fought off a carjacking attempt near the Superdome.123 After
Thompson and Freeman were arrested in January for Liuzza’s
murder, Thompson’s photo was published in the TimesPicayune.124 LaGarde showed the photo to his children. They
agreed that Thompson was the man who had tried to rob
them.125
Prosecutors charged Thompson with armed robbery.126
Then they switched the order of the murder and robbery
trials.127 They hoped to use the robbery conviction to keep
Thompson off the stand at the murder trial, to impeach him if
he testified, and to win a death sentence.128 One prosecutor told
Thompson at the robbery trial, “I’m going to fry you. You will
die in the electric chair.”129 With the exception of that specific
denouement, the prosecution’s strategy succeeded.
The strategy succeeded in part because Thompson’s
lawyers and the jurors in his robbery trial did not know that a
patch of bloody cloth exonerated him on that charge. During
the investigation of the LaGarde robbery, law enforcement
officers seized a blood swatch from the scene.130 Prosecutors
ordered the blood tested before Thompson’s trial for the
LaGarde robbery.131 The swatch tested type B,132 but the
prosecution disclosed neither the swatch nor the lab report to
the defense. Thompson’s trial lawyer had asked the property
technician before trial if there was any blood evidence.133 He
was told that “[t]hey didn’t have any.”134 On the first day of the
robbery trial, assistant prosecutor Gerry Deegan “checked all of
the physical evidence in the case out of the police property
room.”135 The next day Deegan returned everything but the

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Thompson, 553 F.3d at 843.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1374 & n.7 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,

dissenting).
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id. at 1356 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 1372-73 & n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1356 (majority opinion).
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blood swatch.136 At the time, Deegan was just out of law school
and had worked in Connick’s office for less than a year.137
During Thompson’s murder trial, the prosecution also
failed to disclose several pieces of impeachment evidence. First,
law enforcement had secretly taped the conversation between
the Liuzza family and Richard Perkins, the man who originally
incriminated Thompson in the Liuzza murder.138 At trial,
Perkins denied seeking reward money.139 But on the tape,
Perkins had said, “I don’t mind helping . . . but I would like [you]
to help me and, you know, I’ll help you.”140 After the family had
told Perkins that they wanted to try to help him, he implicated
Thompson and Freeman.141 The prosecution also failed to
disclose eyewitness testimony describing Liuzza’s killer as “six
feet tall, with ‘close cut hair.’”142 That description matched
Thompson’s codefendant, Freeman. In contrast, Thompson was
five-feet, eight-inches tall and had a large Afro.143 The
prosecution also failed to disclose pretrial statements attributed
to the codefendant Freeman, the key witness against Thompson,
which were materially inconsistent with Freeman’s trial
testimony.144 Without the benefit of the foregoing evidence, and
facing impeachment with the attempted robbery conviction if he
took the stand, Thompson elected not to testify.145 He was
convicted and sentenced to death.146
Thompson was incarcerated for eighteen years after his
arrest in January 1985. He spent fourteen of those years in
twenty-three-hour-a-day solitary confinement in a six-by-nine
foot windowless death row cell.147 He faced six different
execution dates148 as his case moved through direct appeal,
state postconviction, and federal habeas.149 A month before his
final execution date, a last-ditch investigation in police archives
unearthed a microfiche copy of the report documenting that the
Id.
Id. at 1372 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 1371.
139 Id. at 1374.
140 Id. at 1371.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1371-72.
144 Id. at 1374.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1355 (majority opinion); Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 842,
865 (5th Cir. 2008).
148 John Thompson, Op-Ed., The Prosecution Rests, but I Can’t, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/10/opinion/10thompson.html?pagewanted=all.
149 State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 552-53 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
136
137
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LaGarde robber had type B blood.150 The defense tested
Thompson’s blood. It was type O.151 The report proved Thompson
innocent of the attempted robbery conviction that had kept him
from testifying in his own defense at the murder trial and had
helped the prosecution argue for his execution.152
After the defense investigator uncovered the blood test
results, a former prosecutor named Michael Riehlmann came
forward. Riehlmann admitted that, five years earlier, Gerry
Deegan had confessed to hiding exculpatory blood evidence in
Thompson’s robbery case.153 Deegan was the recent law graduate
who assisted with the prosecution of the robbery case; he
confessed to hiding the evidence after learning that he was dying
of cancer.154 Despite Riehlmann’s encouragement, Deegan did
not come forward.155 For the next five years, neither did
Riehlmann.156
Based on the blood mismatch, the trial court vacated
Thompson’s attempted robbery conviction,157 and Connick’s office
dismissed that charge.158 The trial judge in the murder case
denied Thompson’s request for a new trial but vacated his death
sentence.159 The appellate court ordered a new trial on the
murder charge.160 The court found it unnecessary to rule on
Thompson’s Brady claim but concluded that the prosecution’s
“egregious” misconduct in the “intentional hiding of exculpatory
evidence” caused violations of Thompson’s rights to present a
defense and testify on his own behalf at the first trial.161
Connick’s office retried the murder charge but the codefendant,
Freeman, had died in the interim.162 Without Freeman’s live
testimony (the jury heard his prior testimony read back)—but
with the benefit of the previously withheld evidence and
Thompson’s testimony—the jury voted to acquit after thirty-five
minutes’ deliberation.163
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1356 & n.1.
Id.
Id. at 1374-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 553 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 557-58.
Id. at 557.
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1375-76 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,

dissenting).
163

Id.
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Deliberate Indifference

The jury in Thompson’s federal civil rights case found
that the admitted Brady violation resulted from deliberate
indifference to prosecutors’ obvious need for training on their
due process disclosure duties.164 Writing for the five-member
majority, Justice Thomas limited the scope of the Brady
violation at issue to nondisclosure of the lab report, which
Connick conceded was a violation of Thompson’s due process
rights.165 The Court then held that Thompson had failed to
meet his burden to prove deliberate indifference because he
showed neither that there was a pattern of prior violations that
should have notified defendants of the need for training nor
that the need for training was otherwise obvious.166 On the
latter point, the majority concluded that municipalities that
might otherwise face liability for failure to train prosecutors on
their due process discovery duties could reasonably rely on law
schools, bar exams, continuing legal education programs, and
professional disciplinary procedures to fill the breach.167
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg found ample record
evidence to support the jury’s finding of deliberate indifference,
including multiple Brady violations by “no fewer than five
prosecutors” who, “year upon year,” withheld evidence “vital to
[Thompson’s] defense.”168 The dissenters also disagreed that
Connick justifiably relied on law schools and other institutions

Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1357 & n.3 (majority opinion).
166 Id. at 1358-66 (citing Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). The majority did not cite the unanimous 2009
decision in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein to apply absolute immunity to petitioners despite
being urged to do so. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 18, Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350
(No. 09-571); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorneys in
Support of Petitioners at 7-8, Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (No. 09-571); Brief of Amicus
National District Attorneys Association at 16, Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (No. 09-571).
Van de Kamp granted absolute immunity to prosecutors sued in their individual
capacities for damages caused by their failure to sufficiently train and supervise their
deputy district attorneys in preventing the nondisclosure of material impeachment
evidence. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 339 (2009). On remand, the plaintiff
settled for monetary damages from the city of Long Beach, Goldstein v. City of Long
Beach, CV 04-9692, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111195 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010), after the
District Court expressed “little doubt that Plaintiff w[ould] succeed in proving” that the
withheld evidence satisfied Brady and sketched the likely jury instructions regarding
the prosecutors’ violations of their due process disclosure duties. Id. at *8-11.
167 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361-63.
168 Id. at 1374-75, 1383 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Alito
joined in a concurring opinion taking issue with Justice Ginsburg’s analysis. Id. at
1366-70 (Scalia & Alito, JJ., concurring).
164
165
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to fulfill the training requirements necessary to prevent due
process disclosure violations in his office.169
Several aspects of the majority opinion elide core
meanings of due process discovery doctrine. Greater fidelity to
prosecutors’ truth-speaking and justice-seeking duties might
have reinforced the doctrinal stability that encourages
compliance with those duties.170 Examples include the
majority’s cabining of its analysis to what it defined as a “single
Brady violation” that occurred when one or more prosecutors
failed to turn over the lab report.171 Another is the conclusion
that prior reversals of Orleans Parish convictions for Brady
violations were irrelevant to the jury’s finding of deliberate
indifference because “[n]one of those cases involved failure to
disclose blood evidence, a crime lab report, or physical or
scientific evidence of any kind.”172 Yet another is the empirical
support (or absence thereof) in the majority’s assessment of
whether the need for prosecutorial training was obvious.173 Also
noteworthy is the sotto voce questioning in the majority
opinion, rendered overt in the concurrence, of whether Orleans
Parish prosecutors violated Brady by failing to disclose the lab
report since they did not know Thompson’s blood type.174 These
aspects of the majority opinion typify the diminution of core
due process meanings that might influence adjudication of
substantive constitutional criminal procedure claims, create
uncertainty in the law, and reduce its deterrent effect.175 This
discussion focuses on the first and last points identified above.
1. Canton-izing Cumulative Review
Cabining the misconduct in John Thompson’s case to
the conceded nondisclosure of the lab report is inconsistent
with the core due process principle that Brady materiality

Id. at 1380-81, 1385-86 & nn.21-22 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Laurin, supra note 108, at 1058-72.
171 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1357-60.
172 Id. at 1360. At least two other Orleans Parish defendants sought Brady
relief after prosecutors failed to disclose lab reports documenting test results on
biological samples; in both cases, courts held the undisclosed evidence to fail Brady’s
materiality test. Joseph v. Whitley, No. 92-2335, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17385, at *5-12
(E.D. La. 1992); State v. Walter, 675 So. 2d 831, 833-35 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
173 See supra note 21.
174 Compare Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1357 & n.3 (majority opinion), with id. at
1369-70 (Scalia & Alito, JJ., concurring).
175 See Laurin, supra note 108, at 1059-61.
169
170
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must be assessed cumulatively.176 The majority subordinated
that principle in favor of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remedial rule
pulled from dicta in Canton v. Harris.177 To fit Canton’s
Procrustean bed, the Connick majority trimmed Orleans Parish
prosecutors’ acts and omissions down to a “single Brady
violation” or a “single-incident.”178
In considering the majority’s subordination of the
cumulative materiality principle, it is important to
acknowledge that no court ever expressly ruled that Connick’s
office violated Brady in Thompson’s case. But the state Court of
Appeal concluded that the prosecutors committed “egregious”
misconduct through the “intentional hiding of exculpatory
evidence.”179 That court also concluded that the “intentional
hiding of exculpatory evidence” caused the violations of
Thompson’s right to testify and present a defense, which in
turn required a new trial on the murder charge.180 These tightly
linked state court findings and conclusions comprise the
essential elements of a Brady violation: Orleans Parish
prosecutors failed to disclose evidence materially beneficial to
the defense. The absence of an express judicial ruling on
Thompson’s Brady claims should not have weighed against him
in the subsequent civil rights litigation. And the state courts’
granting relief on alternate grounds certainly did not warrant
subordination of cumulative prejudice analysis to Canton’s
single-incident calculus.
Similarly, Connick’s admitting that his office violated
Brady by failing to disclose the lab report did not support the
majority’s elision of cumulative materiality. Both the content
and the context of the admission make the point clear. Connick
testified before the jury in Thompson’s civil rights case that he
knew the lab report was Brady material.181 More specifically, he
testified that he knew nondisclosure of the report was illegal
because in a prior case he “got indicted by the U.S. Attorney”
for failing to disclose a lab report to the defense.182
176 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995); see also Connick, 131 S. Ct. at
1377 & n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421) (jury not limited
to nondisclosure of lab report).
177 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359-69 (majority opinion) (discussing Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1989)).
178 Id. at 1356, 1361.
179 Louisiana v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 557 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
180 Id.
181 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1380 n.13 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
182 Id. (“[A] prosecutor must disclose a crime lab report to the defense, even if
the prosecutor does not know the defendant’s blood type: ‘Under the law it qualifies as
Brady material. Under Louisiana law we must turn that over. Under Brady we must
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Connick’s sworn admission grounds a reasonable
inference, apparently reached by the federal jury, that he had
ample notice of the need to train his line prosecutors on Brady
compliance. Connick’s admission on the lab report expressly
references a prior Brady allegation directly on point in
Thompson’s civil rights case. The admission weighs in favor of
incorporating the core cumulative prejudice principle into the
section 1983 analysis and weighs against the majority’s
subordinating that principle to Canton’s single-incident doctrine.
2. See No Evil: Incorporating a Subjective Knowledge
Element into Brady Analysis
Connick’s admission regarding the lab report took an
even stronger turn on appeal of the civil rights verdict. There,
the defendants argued that “the blood evidence was obviously
exculpatory” and that nondisclosure was “a clear violation of
the law.”183 Once again, the state Court of Appeal’s reasoning
seems significant. Even setting aside the rather abundant
impeachment evidence that prosecutors failed to disclose184 in
addition to the conceded nondisclosure of the lab report, the
record also contains the state Court of Appeal’s conclusion that
prosecutors intentionally hid exculpatory evidence.185 It is not
clear that prosecutors intentionally withheld the lab report.186
But Deegan admitted to deliberately hiding exculpatory
evidence; he took the physical evidence out of police custody
and returned everything but the blood swatch.187 Applying
cumulative materiality analysis, the swatch had exculpatory
value independent of the lab report, and the prosecution had a
duty to disclose it regardless of the existence of any lab report.

turn that over.’”). In 1989, Connick pleaded not guilty to federal conspiracy charges for
giving documents to another defendant who, Connick contended, needed them to
defend himself on bookmaking charges. New Orleans Official Denies Aiding Gambler,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1989, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
1989/12/22/us/new-orleans-official-denies-aiding-gambler.html.
183 Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 857 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Connick, 131 S. Ct. at
1372 & n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[A]ny reasonable prosecutor would have recognized
blood evidence as Brady material . . . [accordingly,] ‘the proper response’ was ‘obvious to
all.’”). The court of appeals rejected this “obvious violation” defense not because it
disagreed with the statement but because while Connick conceded his Brady duty to turn
over the blood evidence, his line prosecutors did not. Connick, 553 F.3d at 857.
184 See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
185 Thompson, 825 So. 2d at 557.
186 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356 (lead prosecutor denied seeing the report).
187 Id.
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This is so because the swatch, on its own, would have alerted
the defense to the need to check Thompson’s blood type.188
On this point, and of the remaining highlighted aspects
of the majority and concurring opinions, perhaps the most
powerful evidence of Brady’s anemic enforceability is the
conclusion of Justices Scalia and Alito regarding the lab report.
Their concurring opinion reasoned that the failure to disclose
the lab report revealing the blood type of the LaGarde robber
was probably not a Brady violation because prosecutors did not
know John Thompson’s blood type.189 Notably, the opening lines
of the relatively terse majority opinion also emphasized the
absence of proof that prosecutors tested Thompson’s blood or
“knew what his blood type was.”190 Justices Scalia and Alito
went further. They denied awareness of any Supreme Court
case law supporting what they described as the dissent’s “sub
silentio expansion of the substantive law of Brady” to
encompass a duty to reveal “untested” evidence that could
exonerate a defendant.191
To be fair, the concurrence tweaked the dissent for citing
no case in which a Brady violation rests solely on a withheld lab
report.192 Nevertheless, the fact that two United States Supreme
Court Justices could view the lab report documenting the robber’s
blood type as comprising untested evidence underscores the
many profound problems undermining Brady enforceability.
Similarly revealing is the concurring Justices’ citation of Arizona
v.
Youngblood193
to
support
their
not-very-silentio
circumscription of prosecutors’ constitutional disclosure duties to
evidence that they subjectively know to be exculpatory. As the
concurrence acknowledged, subjective knowledge is irrelevant to
Brady analysis.194

188 See also id. at 1373 & n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that at the federal
trial, the jury was told of the parties’ stipulation that the prosecution did not inform the
defense “of the existence of the blood evidence, that the evidence had been tested, [or] that a
blood type was determined definitively from the swatch” (emphasis added)).
189 Id. at 1369 (Scalia & Alito, JJ., concurring).
190 Id. at 1356 (majority opinion).
191 Id. at 1369 (Scalia & Alito, JJ., concurring).
192 Id. But see Joseph v. Whitley, No. 92-2335, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17385,
at *5-12 (E.D. La. 1992) (Orleans Parish prosecutors failed to disclose blood samples
and test results; undisclosed evidence held not to meet Brady’s materiality test.); State
v. Walter, 675 So. 2d 831, 833-35 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (no abuse of discretion in denial of
new trial after Orleans Parish prosecutors failed to disclose a lab report in time for the
defense to investigate and use the information at trial).
193 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
194 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1369.
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In fact, prosecutors’ disclosure duties were not squarely
at issue in Youngblood. The case did not involve prosecutors’
deliberate suppression of biological evidence or nondisclosure of
potentially exculpatory lab reports. The problem in Youngblood
was the inability to test the biological evidence at issue (semen
samples) because one set of samples was too small and
investigators failed to preserve another sample for testing.195
The Court’s chief concern in Youngblood was to avoid
burdening the nation’s myriad law enforcement offices by
imposing a due process duty to preserve potentially exculpatory
evidence in all cases.196
The citation of Youngblood by the Connick concurrence is
a transitive error. A forensic sample that cannot be tested, like
the semen in Youngblood, is distinguishable from the tested
blood swatch in John Thompson’s case. The blood swatch tests
yielded dispositive results. Those results were recorded in a lab
report. The lab report revealed what the defense, with minimal
investigation, could establish to be wholly exculpatory evidence.
That type of tested forensic evidence and forensic report
defines materiality under Brady. This is so in part because the
full value of exculpatory evidence can only be determined ex
post, in the context of an adequate defense opportunity to
investigate and litigate its meaning at trial. Those opportunities
were denied to both Youngblood and Thompson. But unlike
Youngblood, Thompson’s only impediment to investigating and
litigating the exculpatory value of the retained, tested evidence
was the prosecution’s failure to disclose it.
The concurrence failed to mention another reason that
Youngblood supports rather than refutes Thompson’s position:
Youngblood was innocent. Like Thompson, he was imprisoned
for years before evidence of his wrongful convictions led to his
release.197 In Youngblood’s case, it took fifteen years before
advances in DNA technology allowed testing on the remnants
of the biological evidence.198 Those tests led authorities to
195 488 U.S. at 53-54 (discussing trial court’s denial of state’s motion to test
defendant’s blood and saliva because semen sample was inadequate for valid
comparison); cf. State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 595-96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d,
488 U.S. 51 (1988) (“This is not a case where the samples were available for
defendant’s examination.”). But see State v. Youngblood, 844 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Ariz.
1993) (semen sample “was available to the defendant at trial and the defendant chose
not to perform tests of his own”).
196 Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.
197 Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood: Due Process, Lost
Evidence, and the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 241, 243-44 nn.5-7 (2008).
198 Id.
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identify and convict the child sex offender who had kidnapped
and sodomized the ten-year-old victim.199 The silence of the
Connick concurrence on the full story of Youngblood tracks the
corresponding subordination by both the majority and the
concurring opinions of the prosecutors’ core due process duties,
developed from Mooney through Kyles, to speak truth and seek
justice. The strained reasoning in those opinions with respect to
the blood swatch, the lab report, and the undisclosed impeachment
evidence significantly weakens Brady enforceability. The
majority’s wink-and-nod to due process disclosure violations
highlights the same majority’s elision of constitutional discovery
duties in Garcetti.
C.

Garcetti v. Ceballos: Riding the Rims to the Junkyard Gate

According to the defense attorneys for Michael Cuskey
and Randy Longoria, the events that culminated in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos arose because
Sheriff’s deputies in Pomona County, California lacked sufficient
evidence to arrest Cuskey and Longoria for running a chop
shop.200 After his arrest, Cuskey threw fuel on the fire by suing
the Sheriff’s department.201 On this theory, when deputies spotted
a stripped-down, stolen truck near Cuskey’s junkyard,202 they saw
a chance to link the truck to the defendants. They asked their
supervisor, Detective Wall, to obtain a warrant to search the
junkyard.203 Based on the deputies’ statements, Wall swore out an
affidavit describing “tire tracks which appeared to match the
tread pattern” of the stolen truck leading to “the end of a long
driveway” and the fence that marked Cuskey’s property line.204
The magistrate issued the warrant. The deputies
searched the property. They found no evidence to support their
chop shop suspicions.205 But while the warrant focused on
stolen vehicle parts, the deputies brought along a drug dog that
sniffed out a small amount of methamphetamine.206 The
Id.
Joint App’x Vol. II at 346, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04473), 2005 WL 1620384.
201 Id. at 238.
202 Id. at 257 (where court asked whether the property was a “junkyard,” one
deputy demurred, “every man, it’s his castle,” but agreed “there were car parts on that
property, there were birds, there were animals, there were refrigerators . . . all kinds of
stuff,” including what “looked like an alligator . . . .”).
203 Joint App’x Vol. I at 28, Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410 (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1620385.
204 Joint App’x Vol. III at 497, Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410 (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1620386.
205 Id. at 498.
206 Id.
199

200
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deputies also seized some firearms.207 Cuskey, Longoria, and a
third defendant named Ojala were charged with felony drug
and weapon possession offenses.208 Ojala pleaded guilty and
began serving a one-year jail sentence.209
Meanwhile, the lawyers for Cuskey and Longoria
investigated the allegations in the search warrant. Based on
that investigation, they alleged that the deputies had lied to
obtain the affidavit. The junkyard was not at the end of a long
driveway but on a road that was the length of a football field.210
The road was thirty- to forty-feet wide, “equal to if not greater
than a standard residential street.”211 At least nine other
residences faced onto the same road; all of those homeowners
had to use the road to enter and exit their properties.212 The
road was made of asphalt, gravel, and dirt. There was
“absolutely no way” tire-tread patterns could lead from the
truck to Cuskey’s junkyard fence.213 In the one spot where tread
marks appeared, it was “almost impossible” to tell from which
of the ten properties they originated.214
The defense lawyers filed a motion to traverse the
warrant.215 If granted, the motion would have required
dismissal of the charges.216 The defense lawyers gave their
investigative materials to Richard Ceballos. As supervising
prosecutor, Ceballos had authority to dismiss the case.217
Ceballos investigated the defense allegations and consulted
with supervisors and colleagues.218 All the prosecutors agreed
“there was a problem with the warrant.”219
Ceballos then talked with Detective Wall, the officer
who had sworn out the affidavit supporting the warrant.220
Ceballos confronted Wall with the defense allegations that the
tire tread marks running from the truck to Cuskey’s gate were
“a figment of the deputy’s imagination, that they had lied, that
Id.
Id. at 406.
209 Id. at 496.
210 Id. at 499.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 500.
215 Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 48; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1539
(1985) (providing for hearing on motion controverting facts in warrant).
216 Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 48.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 39.
220 Id. at 37.
207
208
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they had made up the fact that they had seen these tire
tracks.”221 Ceballos later told Wall that the charges would likely
be dismissed because of the affidavit’s “grossly inaccurate”
description of the road.222
Wall then made a crucial admission. He told Ceballos
that he had spoken to the deputies.223 He said that the affidavit
should be “modified.”224 He wanted to change “tire tracks” to
“‘tire gouges,’ caused by the rims of the stolen truck scraping
along the roadway.”225 Ceballos asked when the officers decided
to modify the affidavit. Wall did not answer.226 Ceballos wrote a
memorandum recommending dismissal of the charges based on
the misrepresentations and omissions in the affidavit.227 He
cited Franks v. Delaware in support.228
Franks allows Fourth Amendment challenges to the
veracity of affiants’ statements supporting warrants.229 The
Franks Court reasoned that probable cause “would be reduced
to a nullity” if an officer could use false evidence to obtain a
warrant and “remain confident that the ploy” could never be
exposed through the adversarial process.230 Given the
magistrate’s constitutional duties, the Court concluded, “it
would be an unthinkable imposition upon his authority if a
warrant affidavit, revealed after the fact to contain a

Id.
Joint App’x Vol. III, supra note 204, at 502.
223 Id. at 503.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. The issue arose a few months after the Rampart investigation revealed
large-scale corruption, including perjury, evidence planting, drug dealing, violent crimes,
and other misconduct by the Los Angeles police department’s anti-gang unit. Erwin
Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Board of
Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 547-53 (as revised
2005). As the district court put it in ruling on Ceballos’s subsequent civil rights claim:
221
222

[T]he code word “Rampart” says it all—there can be no doubt that, in
Southern California, police misconduct is a matter of great political and
social concern to the community. In recent years, various local law
enforcement agencies have been severely criticized for what many believe to
be serious misconduct on the part of police officers.
Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV 00-11106 AHM (AJWx), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039, at
*15 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002).
227 Joint App’x Vol. III, supra note 204, at 503 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978)).
228 Id.
229 Franks, 438 U.S. at 156.
230 Id. at 168.
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deliberately or recklessly false statement, were to stand beyond
impeachment.”231
Franks challenges are equivalent to perjury allegations
against law enforcement officers. Such challenges seldom
succeed.232 In the rare cases in which Franks relief is granted,
however, it is based on the type of prevarication documented in
Ceballos’s memorandum.233 Ceballos’s supervisor was
concerned enough about the affidavit’s veracity that he
authorized the release of the third defendant, who was already
serving time on his guilty plea.234 But the supervisor also asked
Ceballos to revise the memo. He wanted to give the Sheriff’s
department a less accusatory explanation for dismissing the
charges.235
Although Ceballos edited the memo as requested, the
deputies still accused him of acting like a defense lawyer. They
worried that dismissal might give Cuskey grounds for another
lawsuit.236 Ceballos’s supervisor decided against dismissing the
charges. He chose instead to leave any decision on the Franks
allegations to the “black robe” presiding over the suppression
hearing.237
Before the Franks hearing, but after consulting with his
supervisors, Ceballos gave a redacted version of his memo to

231 Id. at 165. Further research is needed to trace the extent to which a
concern to protect the court’s integrity connects doctrines underlying Brady, Franks,
and “fraud on the court” analyses. For a definition of the latter allegation, see, for
example, Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2005) (defining
“demanding” burden of proving fraud on the court by “clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence” of intentional and successful deception of the court through “the
most egregious conduct” by an officer of the court).
232 See generally Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police
Reform: Using Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA.
L. REV. 351, 363-65, 367 & nn.44-58 & 70 (2011) (describing causes and consequences
of law enforcement perjury, or “testilying”).
233 United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614, 624 (7th Cir. 2001) (remanding
case to determine if search warrant was deficient when officers altered versions of
events and facts did not match description); United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765,
774-75 (8th Cir. 2001) (approving trial court’s refusal to “bolster” affidavit with new
and different information beneficial to the prosecution); United States v. DeLeon, 979
F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1992) (remanding case due to material omissions in affidavit).
234 Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 42-44.
235 Id. at 113-18.
236 Id. at 49.
237 Id. at 117-18. Another supervisor reviewed the affidavit and the results of
Ceballos’s investigation. He agreed that the affidavit contained “obvious material
misrepresentations and omissions per Franks v. Delaware.” Joint App’x Vol. III, supra
note 204, at 411-12. After the meeting, Ceballos confronted his supervisor about
“kowtowing to the sheriff’s department, of ignoring the fact that these deputy sheriffs
had lied, and of setting aside his obligations simply to appease the sheriff’s captain and
lieutenant.” Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 23.
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the defense.238 He also insisted that he would have to testify for
the defense if subpoenaed.239 His immediate supervisor warned
that if he kept “thinking . . . [and] talking like that” he would
get “in trouble.”240 Ceballos interpreted this warning as an
attempt to dissuade him from testifying and as a threat to
retaliate if he did so.241 He received the defense subpoena and
decided that “regardless of the consequences” he was going to
“tell the truth” at the suppression hearing.242
Ceballos was not allowed to testify to his own
conclusions about the deputies’ veracity. But he did testify that
the deputies wanted to change the affidavit.243 Although the
affidavit specifically stated that the deputies had followed “tire
tracks matching the tread pattern” of the stolen truck, the
deputies testified differently at the hearing. There, they
described tracing a “scratch” or “indentation” made by a tire
rim from the stolen truck to Cuskey’s gate.
Ceballos knew the presiding judge as “a good judge for
prosecutors.”244 The judge recited the affidavit’s “specific”
description of each of the truck’s four tires.245 The judge was
unmoved by the affidavit’s failure to mention any flat tire or
rim.246 He was similarly unmoved by disparities between the
deputies’ descriptions of the flat tire.247 He credited the
deputies’ testimony and denied the defense motion.248
Shortly thereafter, Ceballos was demoted.249 He also was
taken off a murder case and offered “freeway therapy” (a
different job with a long commute).250 He exhausted the available
grievance process and filed his civil rights action.251 He urged
that his conduct was required by Brady v. Maryland and that
his supervisors’ retaliation violated the First Amendment and
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.252
Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 56.
Id. at 57.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 58.
242 Id. at 58-59.
243 Joint App’x Vol. II, supra note 200, at 297-308.
244 Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 60.
245 Joint App’x Vol. II, supra note 200, at 349 (“emergency tires . . . on the
right front and left rear . . . a white spoke type wheel with a Sonic brand . . . on the left
front . . . a Firestone . . . on the right rear”).
246 Id. at 348-49.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 12-13.
250 Id. at 13.
251 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 415 (2006).
252 Joint App’x Vol. I, supra note 203, at 139-40.
238
239
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Brady Duties in the Pretrial Context

With the core meanings of Brady-line duties firmly
rooted in the mandate to speak truth and seek justice,
Ceballos’s constitutional duty to speak out as he did might
seem obvious. Contrary to the Supreme Court majority opinion,
Ceballos did not write his memorandum because “he did not
receive a satisfactory explanation for the perceived
inaccuracies” in the affidavit.253 His independent investigation
of the defense allegations confirmed that the affidavit could not
be true. He confronted the lead detective and was told the
sworn affidavit should be “modified.”254 Ceballos was not alone
in concluding that this admission supported the perjury
allegation and that he had a duty to turn the information over
to the defense.255
The first set of federal judges to consider the issue
agreed that Ceballos had a duty to inform his supervisors
about what he had learned. The district court judge cited Brady
to hold that when Ceballos wrote his memorandum, “he was
complying with his (and the government’s) duties under the
due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
not to introduce or rely on evidence known to be false.”256 On
appeal, two Ninth Circuit judges concluded that, taking the
evidence in a light most favorable to Ceballos, his
memorandum comprised “[g]ood-faith statements made in
pursuit of [the] obligation” imposed upon prosecutors by their
“duty to disclose information favorable to an accused, including
information relating to a witness’s veracity and integrity.”257
The concurring judge also viewed the memorandum as
performing “the basic communicative duty Brady imposes on
‘the prosecution.’ . . . Ceballos was simply ‘doing what he was
supposed to do’ as a deputy district attorney carrying out nondiscretionary quintessentially ‘prosecutorial functions.’”258
The district court and Ninth Circuit drew upon the
parties’ pleadings and summary judgment arguments. But if
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414.
Joint App’x Vol. III, supra note 204, at 503.
255 Id. at 411-12 (memorandum of Deputy District Attorney Michael Grosbard,
concluding that Franks required disclosure of investigators’ “obvious material
misrepresentations and omissions”); Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (“[A] prosecutor
anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence.”).
256 Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV 00-11106 AHM (AJWx), 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28039, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002).
257 Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004).
258 Id. at 1189 & n.3 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in the judgment).
253
254
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(as it appears) the lawyers and judges were relying on the four
corners of the Supreme Court’s Brady-line jurisprudence as the
basis for Ceballos’s constitutional disclosure duty, they were
overreaching. From Mooney through Kyles, the Supreme Court
has consistently emphasized that constitutional criminal
discovery duties and rights protect interests in a fair trial.259 None
of the Supreme Court’s Brady-line cases impose a constitutional
disclosure duty upon prosecutors in the pretrial setting.
To the contrary, by the time Ceballos wrote his
memorandum, the Court had held that prosecutors have no
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence before a defendant is
indicted, at least in the specialized setting of the grand jury
hearing.260 In dicta in United States v. Agurs, the Court also
had indicated that there was no pretrial disclosure duty by
stating that prosecutors could reveal Brady information
“during the course of a trial.”261 The federal courts of appeals
have generally agreed that prosecutors can wait until quite late
in the game to comply with constitutionally mandated
disclosure duties—even after defense cross-examination of a
prosecution witness.262
The litigants and the courts in Ceballos’s case were
silent on the significance of this doctrinal problem in applying
Brady to the disclosures prompted by Cuskey’s motion to
traverse. On one hand, such silence may not have been wholly
inappropriate. Ceballos had evidence indicating that law
enforcement officers committed perjury. There were two
opportunities for that evidence to have any meaningful effect:
the memorandum recommending dismissal and, absent
dismissal, the Franks hearing on the motion to traverse the
warrant. On those facts, the core constitutional meaning of due
process disclosure duties—speaking truth, seeking justice,
disclosing material exculpatory and impeachment evidence—
could have trumped the absence of any binding Supreme Court
precedent on the need for pretrial disclosure.
On the other hand, the silence of the litigants and
courts on the unsettled timing-of-disclosure doctrine may
indicate inattention. A few weeks before the district court ruled
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1976).
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992).
261 427 U.S. at 107.
262 United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting
United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (1983)); see also United States v. Burke, 571
F.3d 1048, 1053-56 (10th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases, requiring proof of prejudice from
belated disclosure).
259
260
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on the summary judgment motions in Ceballos’s case, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in another Ninth Circuit
case, United States v. Ruiz.263 That case raised the question
whether Brady requires disclosure of impeachment evidence
during plea bargaining.264 A few months later, and nearly two
years before the Ninth Circuit ruled in Ceballos’s case, a
unanimous Court held that no such duty exists.265 Since Ruiz
arguably had implications for prosecutors’ pretrial disclosure
duties beyond the plea bargaining context—potentially
weakening Ceballos’s civil rights claim—one would reasonably
expect to see some evidence that those implications were
considered, had the litigants or judges done so.
This deepening silence raises the question whether any
federal constitutional precedent imposed a specific disclosure
obligation on Ceballos, in addition to his core due process
duties to speak truth and seek justice, in the context of a
pretrial Franks hearing. Although no court or commentator has
discussed this question, the answer is yes.
In 1993—after the Supreme Court held that no
disclosure duty applied in the grand jury setting, but long
before Cuskey’s defense lawyer challenged Detective Wall’s
affidavit—the Ninth Circuit became the only jurisdiction in the
country to impose Brady-line disclosure duties on prosecutors
in the latter, pretrial setting of a motion to traverse.266 In
United States v. Barton, the defendant argued that his Brady
rights were violated when law enforcement officers let his
marijuana plants rot in their evidence locker.267 Detectives had
seized the marijuana pursuant to a warrant.268 They obtained
the warrant by swearing in an affidavit that they had smelled
marijuana at Barton’s house.269 Barton challenged the truth of
534 U.S. 1074 (2002) (granting certiorari Jan. 4, 2002).
536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002).
265 Id. at 630-33. Specifically, the Ruiz Court held that due process does not
bar requirements that defendants waive their rights to impeachment evidence as a
condition of accepting a plea bargain; such a waiver does not render the plea
involuntary. Id. at 630, 633.
266 United States v. Barton, 995 F.2d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 1993); cf. Mays v. City
of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 816 (6th Cir. 1998) (where a Franks challenge alleges
omission of disputed facts from warrant affidavit, defendants must make “a strong
preliminary showing that the affiant with an intention to mislead excluded critical
information from the affidavit, and the omission is critical to the finding of probable
cause”). But see United States v. Stott, 245 F.3d 890, 902-03 & n.9 (7th Cir. 2001)
(applying plain error analysis and finding no clear rule that Brady applies to
suppression hearings; collecting cases).
267 995 F.2d at 932.
268 Id.
269 Id.
263
264
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that statement. He argued that only marijuana plants with
glandular trichomes emit any odor.270 Had his plants been
preserved, he urged, he could have impeached the detectives
with evidence that his plants had no glandular trichomes and
were therefore odorless.271
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Barton’s
suppression motion.272 The panel reasoned that Barton failed to
prove officers destroyed the plants in bad faith. But to reach
that issue, the court first extended Brady protections to the
pretrial setting of a Franks hearing.273 The panel concluded
that, by violating due process discovery duties (in Barton,
through destruction of material impeachment evidence), an
agent of the prosecution “could feel secure that false allegations
in his or her affidavit for a search warrant could not be
challenged . . . [and] effectively deprive a criminal defendant of
his Fourth Amendment right to challenge the validity of a
search warrant.”274
Excavating the due process disclosure rights and duties
in Ceballos’s case leads to a previously unremarked and precise
core constitutional meaning. At least in jurisdictions within the
Ninth Circuit, prosecutors must seek justice, speak truth, and
disclose material exculpatory and impeachment evidence—
including when defendants challenge the veracity of affidavits
supporting search warrants.275
E.

Discovery Duties Diminished

The Supreme Court’s five-member majority held that
Ceballos had no First Amendment protection against retaliation
for writing the memorandum recommending dismissal of the
charges against Cuskey and Longoria because he conceded that
such activity was part of his official duties as a government

Id. at 933.
Id.
272 Id. at 936.
273 Id. at 934-35 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156, 168 (1978)).
274 Id. at 935.
275 See United States v. Welton, No. CR 09-00153, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71509, at *27 & n.33 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2009) (stating that Barton remains “law of the
circuit” post-Ruiz; collecting cases on imposition of Brady-line duties pretrial), aff’d on
other grounds, 438 F. App’x 555, 556 (9th Cir. 2011); State v. Lewis, No. 31684, 2006
Ida. App. LEXIS 19, at *10, *14-15 (Feb. 13, 2006) (applying Barton to reverse grant of
motion to suppress due to lack of proof that officer destroyed exculpatory audiotape in
bad faith), aff’d, 156 P.3d 565, 569 (Idaho 2007).
270
271
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employee.276 I will not recanvass the abundant commentary277 on
what even the apparently lone scholarly supporter of Garcetti
concedes to be the opinion’s undertheorized treatment of First
Amendment workplace rights for government employees.278 The
majority’s reasoning is formalistic and syllogistic. Ceballos
recorded the Brady information in a charge disposition
memorandum. Ceballos conceded that it was part of his job
duties to produce charge disposition memoranda. The First
Amendment does not protect communications that are part of a
government employee’s job duties. Therefore, the First
Amendment did not protect Ceballos from retaliation for
writing his memorandum.
Concerns about federalism, separation of powers, and
administrative efficiency played a strong role in Garcetti’s
outcome. Those concerns rise to a peak in federal civil rights
actions seeking oversight of local criminal justice systems.
Garcetti also is part of a long and more particular trend toward
concentration of power in, and deference to, the prosecution
function as an administrative entity. Granting the effect of
those concerns in Garcetti, the case carries important
implications for prosecutors’ constitutional discovery duties—
which, in the view of all of the lower federal court judges,
required Ceballos to act as he did. The California Prosecutors
Association and the Association of Deputy District Attorneys of
276 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-24 (2006). The Court did not
address issues of qualified immunity. It would appear that the disclosure duty in the
context of Cuskey’s Franks hearing was “clearly established” for purposes of section
1983 qualified immunity analysis under Barton. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617
(1999) (to establish defendant duty, plaintiffs may cite “controlling authority in their
jurisdiction at the time of the incident which clearly established the rule on which they
seek to rely”); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.32 (1982) (declining to
determine “the circumstances under which ‘the state of the law’ should be ‘evaluated by
reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District
Court’” (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (reviewing federal
district court and court of appeals decisions to determine whether the right at issue
was “clearly established”))); Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he
court must determine whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court or the
appropriate circuit court has clearly established the right in question.”); see also Karen
M. Blum, The Qualified Immunity Defense: What’s “Clearly Established” and What’s
Not, 24 TOURO L. REV. 501, 515 (2008) (“controlling authority from the jurisdiction—
that circuit’s court of appeals or the highest court of the state in which the case was
sitting” may show law is “clearly established” for qualified immunity purposes).
277 See Tarkington, supra note 22, at 2176 & n.5 (citing scholarly commentary).
278 Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 38. Rosenthal contends that Garcetti adopted
“much the same position” that he argued successfully in Gonzalez v. City of Chicago,
239 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2001). Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 33 n.1. But see Elizabeth
Dale, Employee Speech and Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 194 & nn.133-36 (2008)
(arguing for a more limited reading of Gonzalez and Garcetti).
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Los Angeles County urged the same position as amici before
the Supreme Court. They begged the Court to protect
prosecutors’ good-faith compliance with due process discovery
duties.279 Yet the Justices gave the issue little attention. With
few exceptions,280 scholars have followed suit.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Garcetti never
referred directly to prosecutors’ constitutional discovery duties.
A single citation to Brady v. Maryland was sandwiched
between the opinion’s penultimate closing lines.281 Those lines
referenced “safeguards in the form of . . . constitutional
obligations apart from the First Amendment” and an assurance
that such “imperatives . . . protect employees and provide
checks on supervisors who would order unlawful or otherwise
inappropriate actions.”282 The majority opinion was silent on
Ceballos’s claim that it was precisely this imperative that
required him to act as he did, and yet failed to protect him from
alleged retaliation—an allegation that, like all other aspects of
his complaint, had to be construed with every inference in his
favor at the summary judgment stage.283
Justice Stevens’s short dissenting opinion made no
mention of prosecutors’ due process disclosure duties.284 Justice
Souter’s dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg joined, attributed to Ceballos the constitutionally
protected “interest of any citizen in speaking out against a
rogue law enforcement officer.”285 But these dissenters also
viewed the interest at stake as that of a First Amendment right
exercised by a government employee. Therefore, Ceballos’s free
speech interest had to be balanced against a set of powerful
competing interests.286 These dissenters would have weighed
Ceballos’s interest in his favor only if his comments addressed
“official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other
serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety.”287
But Justice Souter’s dissent went further. That opinion
defined Ceballos’s official duties as a prosecutor in a way that
279 Brief of Ass’n of Deputy Dist. Attorneys & Cal. Prosecutors Ass’n as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473).
280 Tarkington, supra note 22, at 2178 & n.13 (responding to Rosenthal, supra
note 22, at 56-57).
281 Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 425.
282 Id. at 425-46.
283 Id. at 442 & n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
284 Id. at 426-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
285 Id. at 431 (Souter, J., dissenting).
286 Id. at 419-20 (majority opinion).
287 Id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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could entail something more than the First Amendment
interest of “any citizen.” Ceballos’s job was “to enforce the law
by constitutional action” and “to exercise the county
government’s prosecutorial power by acting honestly,
competently, and constitutionally.”288 Justice Souter’s dissent
also cited Ceballos’s allegation that Brady required him to
disclose the memorandum to the defense as exculpatory
evidence.289 Finally, this opinion noted, Ceballos’s “claim
relating to [his own] truthful testimony in court must surely be
analyzed independently [of the other aspects of his claim] to
protect the integrity of the judicial process.”290 These
statements marked a path toward relief for Ceballos on
remand.291
Justice Souter’s opinion offered no substantive analysis of
the constitutional doctrine that allegedly compelled Ceballos to
ensure, among other things, that the judge considering Cuskey’s
motion to traverse heard “truthful testimony.” In the lone opinion
viewing Ceballos’s due process disclosure duties as dispositive,
Justice Breyer’s dissent added little doctrinal analysis to Justice
Souter’s. He would have held that Ceballos had a protectable
First Amendment interest because, as a general matter, Ceballos
was engaged in “professional speech—the speech of a lawyer,”
and because, as a prosecutor, he had more specific speech
obligations imposed by the Brady doctrine.292 In Justice Breyer’s
view, those twin circumstances vested a First Amendment
interest in Ceballos’s production of the memorandum because
they simultaneously increased the need to protect the speech at
issue, reduced government interests in controlling the speech,
and lowered the risk of inefficiencies and overreaching that
might occur through judicial trenching on managerial authority
in the government workplace.293

Id. at 437.
Id. at 442.
290 Id. at 444. Justice Souter’s opinion stated that Ceballos’s testimony at the
motion hearing “stopped short of his own conclusions” that the deputies lied. Id. at 442.
This was so because the judge sustained the prosecution’s objections to that testimony.
Joint App’x Vol. III, supra note 204, at 298-303.
291 The case settled shortly after the Supreme Court remanded the case.
Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV 00-11106 AHM (AJWx), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002). Orly Lobel reported that, although the terms of the
agreement are not public, “the settlement may have been very favorable for Ceballos.”
Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping
Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 454 & n.125 (2009).
292 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 446-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
293 Id.
288
289
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With respect to the professional speech prong of Justice
Breyer’s test, Margaret Tarkington has supplied much of the
doctrinal analysis missing from his cursory dissenting
opinion.294 Tarkington also is one of the few scholars to discuss
the facts and law that gave rise to Ceballos’s disclosure duties.
Her work points to the core piece of Brady evidence in the case:
Ceballos’s two conversations with “the police affiant for the
warrant” mentioned in the majority opinion.295
Those conversations comprised Ceballos’s confrontation
of Detective Wall with evidence that the affidavit contained
falsehoods as well as Wall’s subsequent admission about
needing to change the affidavit.296 That evidence had both
exculpatory and impeachment value. First, it tended to show
that the truck could not be traced to Cuskey’s junkyard.
Second, it cast doubt on the investigating officers’ veracity.
Because the evidence called key components of the state’s case
into question, Ceballos’s investigation and Wall’s admission
constituted Brady material, inaccessible to the defense unless
the prosecution complied with the constitutional duty to turn it
over.297 Unsurprisingly, Ceballos, his supervisors, the federal
District Court judge, three Circuit Court judges, and Justice
Breyer all agreed on this point.298 The puzzle remains: why was
294 Tarkington, supra note 22. For California authorities governing Ceballos’s
conduct, see People v. Davis, 309 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1957) (in reference to defense attorney
speech, stating that “counsel may not offer testimony of a witness which he knows to be
untrue” since “[t]o do so may constitute subornation of perjury”); CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 6068(d) (2011) (attorneys have duty to employ “those means only as are
consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by
an artifice or false statement of fact or law”).
295 Tarkington, supra note 22, at 2178 & n.13 (“Ceballos, a member of the
prosecution, talked twice with the police affiant for the warrant” (citing Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 414 (majority opinion))).
296 See supra notes 220-28 and accompanying text.
297 Without accounting for the impeachment value of the officers’ admissions
or the opinions of Ceballos’s supervisors, the lower court judges, and Justice Breyer
that Ceballos had a constitutional disclosure duty, Professor Rosenthal reached the
opposite conclusion. See Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 56-57. An experienced prosecutor
and admitted advocate for the “managerial prerogatives” vindicated in Garcetti, id. at
33, Rosenthal is alone among commentators in acknowledging the relevance of Franks
v. Delaware to the case. Id. at 40 & n.11. He also acknowledged prosecutors’ duties to
obtain and disclose Brady evidence held by law enforcement, id. at 56 & n.72, and
concluded that prosecutors must be protected against retaliation for good-faith
compliance with Brady-line disclosure duties. Id. at 67-68. He might concede that,
regardless of the outcome at the motion hearing, the impeachment value of Wall’s
admission supported a good-faith belief in the prosecutors’ constitutional duty to
disclose it, and agree to the improbability that the officers would have volunteered that
evidence to the defense lawyers who had publicly accused them of misleading or lying
to a magistrate.
298 On the correlation of duties and rights, see generally, Osborn v. Bank of
United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824) (“It is not unusual for a legislative act to involve
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this duty given such short shrift by the Justices and the
majority of commentators?
To be sure, the plaintiff’s pleadings and argument did
not point the Court toward Ceballos’s disclosure duty under
Barton.299 But it is hardly satisfactory to blame the relatively
thin summary judgment record for the almost complete silence
on the core due process principles implicated by the alleged
facts. The case was argued twice. The Court had the benefit of
several amicus briefs. Nor does it seem likely that the Justices
gave Ceballos’s due process duties short shrift because the trial
judge, in denying the Franks motion, effectively ruled that he
had no duty to reveal evidence of police perjury.300 Brady
materiality is determined ex post by estimating the cumulative
value that withheld evidence would have had if the defense had
been able to use it. The rejection of a Brady claim does not
reach back to eliminate a prosecutor’s duty to reveal potentially
exculpatory evidence in time for the defense to incorporate it
into the case investigation and litigation. To the contrary,
Brady requires disclosure, even in close cases, to prevent
prosecutors from “tacking too close to the wind” and infecting
criminal adjudications with unfairness and unreliability.301
Ceballos’s commitment to protecting the integrity of the
judicial process appears to have been in good faith; he was
willing to sacrifice his career for it.
Nor does it solve the puzzle to insist that the case is
really about government employee speech under the First
Amendment and not about due process discovery duties. On
that point, it is noteworthy that the Garcetti majority did not
adopt the view of the District Court and the Court of Appeals’
concurring opinion302 that Ceballos had no protectable interest
in his communication precisely because his speech was required
consequences which are not expressed. An officer, for example, is ordered to arrest an
individual. It is not necessary, nor is it usual, to say that he shall not be punished for
obeying this order. His security is implied in the order itself. . . . [T]he judicial power is
the instrument employed by the government in administering this security.”); Brewer
v. Hoxie Sch. Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91, 100 (8th Cir. 1956) (granting injunction
restraining anti-desegregationists’ interference with plaintiff school board directors’
attempts to comply with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); id. (“[T]he
existence of a Constitutional duty also presupposes a correlative right in the person upon
whom the duty is imposed to be free from direct interference with its performance.”).
299 At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel urged that government employees have
a First Amendment right to speak on any topic that is newsworthy. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 48-50, Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410 (No. 04-473) [hereinafter 2005 Transcript].
300 But see Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 45.
301 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995).
302 See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
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by due process disclosure doctrine. That logic, like the Supreme
Court majority’s, was syllogistic—but more sweeping.
On the reasoning of the lower courts, Ceballos had no
First Amendment protection against retaliation for performing
his job duties. Those duties included notifying his superiors of
the Brady information in Cuskey’s case. Therefore, Ceballos
had no First Amendment protection against retaliation for
communicating Brady information to his superiors. This
reading of Ceballos’s due process disclosure duties submerges
them within First Amendment doctrine. In turn, constitutional
protection against retaliation for prosecutors who comply in
good faith with Brady-line obligations sinks out of sight.
But the Supreme Court majority did not ride that wake
(at least not to its most extreme conclusion) despite being urged
to do so at oral argument.303 Instead, the majority focused
exclusively on the form, not the content, of Ceballos’s
memorandum. For the majority, it was the act of writing such
memoranda, more than the content, that erased Ceballos’s free
speech rights.304 With respect to the content of the
memorandum, the majority threw due process disclosure duties
what turns out to be, on closer analysis, a slender lifeline. The
majority cited Brady not as the basis for submerging due process
protections under First Amendment doctrine, but as
exemplifying constitutional “safeguards” and “imperatives” that
“protect employees and provide checks on supervisors who would
order unlawful or otherwise inappropriate actions.”305 Those
lines trace back to exchanges during oral argument hinting that
Ceballos had his own due process interest at stake.306
One interpretation of the majority opinion is that
prosecutors’ truth-telling and justice-seeking duties are so
fundamental to the proper functioning of justice systems that
they comprise bedrock due process components warranting
protection independent of the First Amendment. The majority’s
implicit retention of independent due process protections on the
facts alleged indicates that, even under a First Amendmentdominant analysis, Ceballos’s federal constitutional obligation
to speak might have changed the outcome in the case had the
litigants focused closely on the core due process principles at
issue and their precise applications to the facts of the case
303
304
305
306

2005 Transcript, supra note 299, at 19-20.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425-26 (2006).
Id.
2005 Transcript, supra note 299, at 22-24.
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under Franks and Barton. As discussed above, it is possible
that the failure to undertake this analysis resulted from
inattention. It is also possible that, had Ceballos’s constitutional
duties been fully fleshed out, a majority might nevertheless have
subordinated those duties to internal management interests.
The Court might have declined to identify a due process right to
be free from retaliation for complying with Brady in the context
of internal agency communication. The Court might have held
that a federal appellate court decision such as Barton does not
clearly establish a right or duty for purposes of a claim filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
But assuming that the due process lifeline traced here
has some strength, focusing on core meanings in the context of
the specific constitutional rights and duties implicated in
Garcetti might have pulled Ceballos’s claim safely ashore. The
claim could have rested directly in due process or undergone
the more complex move from due process through the First and
Fourth Amendments and back again. In either case, the due
process analysis would dominate. But certainly for Richard
Ceballos, Barton reinforced the core Brady duties to disclose
Detective Wall’s statement. The duty triggered a corresponding
right to disclose the information without retaliation.307 Indeed,
as even Ceballos’s supervisors acknowledged, the entire office
shared the same disclosure duty.308 Any remaining adjudicative
work would comprise fact-based determinations to be resolved
on remand, including the credibility of defense denials that any
retaliation occurred.
IV.

FULL OPEN FILE DISCOVERY AS A MODEL FOR REFORM

A.

Opening the Black Box: Law, Politics, and Bureaucracy
in the Regulation of Prosecutorial Decision Making

The Supreme Court acknowledged more than a decade
ago that open file discovery can “increase the efficiency and the
fairness of the criminal process.”309 The same concerns animate
Brady-line requirements for prosecutors and investigative
See supra note 298.
See supra note 255.
309 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n.23 (1999); see also Jennifer
Blasser, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations and Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1962,
1968 (2010) (citing general agreement among symposium attendees that justice is best
served when defense counsel has information “useful” for case assessment,
investigation, and trial as well as for client communication).
307
308
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agencies to disclose information beneficial to the defense.310
Providing defendants with information obtained through
government’s superior investigative resources levels the playing
field. Fact finders make better decisions when adversaries
present their strongest admissible evidence in the most
compelling manner. The finality of reliable verdicts increases
public confidence in the transparency and accountability of
adjudicatory systems. Finality and reliability also reduce the
significant costs resulting from alleged and actual error in
criminal cases—costs borne by defendants, crime victims and
survivors, their families, and the taxpayers who support
prosecutors, public defenders, courts, and prisons.311
Implementation and expansion of full open file criminal
discovery provides an effective model for vindicating the
foregoing interests. The statutes are short and simple.
Prosecutors must provide the complete investigative files,
including any material obtained by law enforcement, to the
defense before trial.312 A file includes investigators’ notes, all
oral statements (which are required to be recorded), and any
other information obtained during the investigation.313 Oral
statements need not be signed or adopted by potential
witnesses to fall under the discovery requirement.314 Work
product privileges are narrowed to “protect the prosecuting
attorney’s mental processes while allowing the defendant
access to factual information collected by the state.”315
Reciprocal discovery of specified material by the defense to the
prosecution is mandated.316 Ex parte motions to restrict
disclosure are allowed where necessary to prevent any
“substantial risk to any person” of harm, intimidation, or even
“unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment.”317 Willful violation
of the statute is punishable as a felony.318
See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
For data on prison costs alone, see, for example, Justice Reinvestment: Facts
and Trends, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT, http://justicereinvestment.org/facts_and_trends
(last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
312 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (2012).
313 Id. § 15A-903(a)(1). Particularly as modified by the 2011 amendments, the
unique combination of provisions in the North Carolina statutes qualify that state’s
reform as “full” open file discovery. Mosteller, supra note 5, at 263.
314 State v. Shannon, 642 S.E.2d 516, 523 (N.C. Ct. App.), review granted, 649
S.E.2d 893 (N.C.), petition withdrawn, 654 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. 2007).
315 Shannon, 642 S.E.2d at 525 (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-904 and
quoting JOHN RUBIN, N.C. INST. OF GOV’T, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 8 (2006)).
316 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-905 to -906 (2012).
317 Id. § 15A-908.
318 Id. § 15A-903(d).
310
311
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The readily available empirical evidence—including
case law, legislative history, and observations of some key
stakeholders—demonstrates that full open file discovery reform
can succeed. The history of full open file reform also illustrates
that litigation and legislation are viable strategies for
regulating prosecutors’ discretionary decision making.319 That
evidence is significant because full open file reform can help
prevent debacles like John Thompson’s convictions and
incarceration, protect prosecutors like Richard Ceballos from
retaliation for complying with disclosure duties, and increase
the fairness, finality, and efficiency of criminal litigation.320
Yet despite the number and magnitude of restrictions
inhibiting enforcement of Brady-line duties; despite the
documented link between disclosure violations and wrongful
despite
the
Supreme
Court’s
implicit
convictions;321
acknowledgement that resources are wasted in litigating
pretrial discovery motions and postconviction Brady claims;322
and despite the unfairness and uncertainty that the Brady
regime creates for defendants, victims, and their families, full
open file discovery remains a rarity in the United States. Reform
on this front lags even as years of dogged litigation and media
attention spur cures—including passage of model uniform
statutes—for the mistaken eyewitness identifications, false
confessions, and flawed forensic analysis that also contribute to
unfair, unreliable, and inefficient outcomes in criminal cases.323
Full open file discovery reform also has received little
scholarly attention.324 Commentators have generally followed
the courts in deferring to prosecutors, and any internal
administrative changes they may choose to make in governing
their own discretionary decision making, as the optimal
prophylaxis against improper nondisclosure and its attendant
costs. In its strongest recent iteration, this trend expressly
despairs of litigation and legislation as effective avenues for
criminal justice reform, at least with respect to the
prosecutorial function. Miller and Wright’s Black Box325 is
See Mosteller, supra note 5, at 306-16.
Id.
321 See supra note 1.
322 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n.23 (1999).
323 See supra note 30.
324 Exceptions include Mosteller, supra note 5. Other scholars recommending
open file reform include Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND.
L.J. 481 (2009); Medwed, supra note 98, at 1557-66 (noting benefits and risks); and
Richard Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 271-73.
325 Miller & Wright, supra note 29.
319
320
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exemplary. Miller and Wright argue that development of
internal data collection protocols is the best, if not the only
mechanism for regulating prosecutorial discretion.326 They cite
Orleans Parish District Attorney Harry Connick, Sr. as an
example of such internal reform.327
The citation carries a Niebuhrian irony.328 On one hand,
the Black Box embodies the opacity of discretionary decision
making by the most powerful players in criminal justice
systems.329 Miller and Wright cogently argue that data
collection, assessment, and reporting can open this Black Box
and bring greater transparency and accountability to charging
decisions, including the identification and correction of any
intentional or unconscious racial bias.330 But bureaucratic
reform is no panacea. For example, Daniel Richman cautions
that Connick’s charge-screening reform was, on closer analysis,
“more like a case study in institutional disarray.”331 And
Pamela Metzger reveals that, even pre-Katrina, Orleans Parish
defendants were jailed without counsel for weeks under local
rules and policies while Connick’s office decided whether and
how to charge them.332
Id. at 128-30.
Id. (citing Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff,
55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 30-36 (2002)); id. at 186-87 (anticipating opportunities for increasing
“‘external’ transparency” through internal agency data collection and assessment).
328 REINHOLD NEIBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1958); Wright &
Miller, supra note 29, at 59 (“New Orleans would probably not appear at the top of
most lists of progressive criminal justice systems.”).
329 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Only
someone who has worked in the field of law enforcement can fully appreciate the vast
power and the immense discretion that are placed in the hands of a prosecutor with
respect to the objects of his investigation.”); Erik J. Luna & Marianne Wade,
Prosecutorial Power: A Transnational Symposium: Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2010) (“In many (if not most) American jurisdictions, the
prosecutor is the criminal justice system. For all intents and purposes, he makes the
law, enforces it against particular individuals, and adjudicates their guilt and resulting
sentences.”); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009) (“No government official in America
has as much unreviewable power and discretion as the prosecutor.”); William J. Stuntz,
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 (2001) (“[L]aw
enforcers, not the law, determine who goes to prison and for how long.”); see generally
DAVIS, supra note 109.
330 Miller & Wright, supra note 29, at 155, 193-95; see also Janet Moore,
Causes, Consequences, and Cures of Racial and Ethnic Disproportionality in Conviction
and Incarceration Rates, 3 FREEDOM CTR. J. 35 (2011) (introducing and moderating
panel discussion with Wayne McKenzie, founding Director of the Prosecution & Racial
Justice Program at the Vera Institute of Justice).
331 Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84
TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2057 (2006).
332 Louisiana’s pretrial procedural rules and local public defender policies
contributed to the problem. Pamela R. Metzger, Doing Katrina Time, 81 TUL. L. REV.
1175, 1177-79 (2007).
326
327
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Moreover, it was during Connick’s nearly thirty-year
tenure as District Attorney of Orleans Parish that John
Thompson became one of several prisoners, including other
death row inmates, whose cases were tainted by Brady
violations. Until Thompson’s case was decided, Kyles v.
Whitley333 was the leading national exemplar of Brady
violations. This was due in part to the sheer scope of the
“blatant and repeated” due process discovery violations by
prosecutors in Connick’s office.334 More recently, the Court held
that the latest Brady violation from Orleans Parish required a
new trial on quintuple-murder charges for a due process
violation that at least one Justice considered so egregious as to
warrant asking the prosecutor during oral argument whether
she had considered forfeiting the case.335
To be clear, Miller and Wright offer no imprimatur for
Connick’s leadership beyond the commitment to data collection
for charge-screening purposes.336 They do argue, however, that
Orleans Parish exemplifies, with respect to the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, how “internal regulation can deliver
even more than advocates of external regulation could hope to
achieve.”337 Legislators and judges, they explain, “have never
answered the calls” for reform, “and the political dynamics of
American criminal justice make it very unlikely that they will
do so in the future.”338
At first glance, the Supreme Court’s constriction of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as a mechanism for enforcing prosecutorial
disclosure duties in Connick v. Thompson and Garcetti v.
Ceballos would seem to support this thesis. Nor are Miller and
Wright alone in promoting a “physician, heal thyself” strategy
for reform of discretionary prosecutorial decision making.
Stephanos Bibas agrees that interbranch regulation and
professional disciplinary oversight comprise a generally
“ineffectual” check on prosecutorial power and joins those who

514 U.S. 419 (1995).
Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring); see supra notes 98-100 and
accompanying text.
335 See supra note 24.
336 Miller & Wright, supra note 29, at 129-33.
337 Id. at 128-29.
338 Id. at 165-66 & nn.104-07 (citing “dynamics of prosecutor elections”); see
also William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969 (2008); William J.
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780 (2006);
Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice;
Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089-92 (1993).
333
334
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offer managerial blueprints for internal agency reform.339 A
recent gathering of scholars and practitioners on criminal
discovery reform also focused on prosecutors’ internal policy
development as the optimal solution for the improper
nondisclosure of information beneficial to the defense.340 For
example, a working group charged with assessing disclosure
processes assumed that “prosecutors will disclose appropriate
information to the defense” and left the issue of nondisclosure
“as a matter for discussion by other Working Groups.”341 The
“Systems and Culture” group could not even reach consensus
on training prosecutors to disclose “favorable” as opposed to
“material” evidence.342
The reticence of courts and scholars vis-à-vis external
regulation of prosecutorial disclosure duties is unsurprising.
Federalism and separation of powers concerns inhibit external
oversight of criminal justice systems. And as a general
statement of realpolitik it is certainly true, as the late William
Stuntz and many others have noted, that the disproportionate
impact of crime and criminal justice processes on low-income
people and people of color is simultaneously a cause and a
consequence of these systems’ resistance to reform through the
traditional avenues of litigation and legislation.343
Deference to prosecutorial agencies with respect to the
vindication of defense discovery rights is also consistent with
the unprecedented concentration of unchecked power in the
prosecutorial function.344 From Brady’s inception onward,
Bibas, supra note 329, at 978.
Ellen Yaroshevsky, Foreword: New Perspectives on Brady and Other
Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1943, 1953-59 (2010)
(summarizing reports); see also Wright, supra note 104, at 1995-2010; Ronald F.
Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587 (2010) (comparing U.S. and civil law systems).
341 Keith A. Findley, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure
Obligations: Report of the Working Group on Best Practices: The Disclosure Process, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 1972 (2010).
342 Wright, supra note 104, at 1998.
343 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010); AFTER THE WAR ON
CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION (Mary Louise Frampton, Ian
Haney Lopez, & Jonathan Simon eds., 2008); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH
CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A
CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); James Forman, Jr., Acknowledging Race in a “Post-Racial”
Era: The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America’s Prisons, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 791
(2011) (noting need to disaggregate race and class effects); Stuntz, Unequal Justice,
supra note 338 (attributing disproportionalities in part to decline in local democracy);
Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug and Crime Control
Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUST. 1, 7-40 (2008) (compiling data, testing
explanations, and proposing provision of racial impact statements to accompany
criminal legislation).
344 See supra note 329.
339
340
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constitutional
doctrine
has
prioritized
deference
to
prosecutorial discretion over enforceability. Case after case
underscores the weakness of Brady-line authorities as
enforceable mechanisms for criminal discovery reform and the
prevention of wrongful convictions. In this context, Connick
and Garcetti comprise the most recent illustration of the
doctrinal subordination of prosecutorial disclosure duties, the
related due process and fair trial rights of defendants, and the
broader interests of criminal justice stakeholders in convictions
and sentences that are worthy of confidence.
B.

The Birth of Reform and the Presumptuousness of Despair

Connick and Garcetti could be taken as more evidence
(if any were needed) justifying despair of litigation and
legislation as effective strategies for criminal justice reform,
particularly in the context of prosecutors’ discovery duties.
That despair might deepen in light of the stalled progress on
federal legislation designed to restore some of the protections
taken from government employees by Garcetti.345 The ironic
death of that legislation by the secret vote of a single senator346
might seem to undercut the thesis that law and politics remain
vibrant and quintessentially democratic avenues toward
criminal justice reform.
But unpacking the Connick-Garcetti interplay should
encourage reformers, despite losses on the litigation and
legislation fronts, to recover subordinated core meanings of
relevant rights and duties and to seek new avenues for their
vindication.347 I view the cases as holding this potential,
perhaps because capital litigation taught me that despair is
nearly always presumptuous. Certainly Connick and Garcetti
illustrate Brady’s complexity and weak enforceability. But the
cases also highlight the contrasting fairness, finality, and
efficiency that can be obtained through full open file discovery
345 The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2010, S. 372, 111th Cong.
(2010) passed unanimously by the House and Senate only to be derailed by a single
anonymous “hold” vote. Tom Devine, Op-Ed., Who Killed the Whistle-blower Bill, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/10/opinion/la-oe-devinewhistleblower-20110110; Lobel, supra note 291, at 454-55 & nn.133-35 (discussing
threatened veto of Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, H.R. 985, 110th Cong.
(2007)); see also Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within
Twenty-First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1256-57 (2009)
(quoting Ceballos’s 2006 testimony before Congress).
346 Devine, supra note 345.
347 Cf. JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND
THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA 1-10 (2003).
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reform. Moreover, it was precisely the type of dogged
investigation and litigation that led to the Connick and
Garcetti rulings—and discontent inspired by similar examples
of the Brady model’s failures—that motivated full open file
reform. In this broader view, the Connick-Garcetti duo may
open a new chapter in the reform story. To appreciate that
possibility, one must consider the irony surrounding the advent
of full open file discovery statutes.
Full open file discovery had its genesis in the “tough on
crime” movement of the late 1990s and the specific desire to
speed the pace of capital postconviction litigation and
executions.348 Like states across the country, North Carolina was
modeling new legislation on the federal Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act.349 During legislative hearings on
the issue in 1996, members of the defense bar cited Robert
McDowell’s capital case as an example of the increased efficiency
that full open file discovery could bring to capital litigation.350
McDowell, a black man, was convicted of capital murder
by a North Carolina jury in 1979.351 After his appeal was
denied,352 his lawyers learned that the prosecution had failed to
disclose evidence at trial that indicated, among other things,
that the assailant was white.353 The dogged investigation and
litigation of McDowell’s Brady claim included multiple rounds
of petitions for review to the United States Supreme Court.354
In 1990, after eleven years of court proceedings,355 McDowell

Mosteller, supra note 5, at 262-64.
Email communications with Staples Hughes, N.C. Appellate Defender;
Malcolm “Tye” Hunter, Dir., Ctr. for Death Penalty Litig., Durham, N.C.; and Robert
Mosteller (on file with the author). I served as an Assistant Appellate Defender under
the leadership of Hunter and Hughes, respectively, between 1998 and 2005.
350 Id.
351 State v. McDowell, 271 S.E.2d 286, 289 (N.C. 1981).
352 Id.
353 McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945, 947 (4th Cir. 1988).
354 Dixon v. McDowell, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989); McDowell v. North Carolina, 451
U.S. 1012 (1981); McDowell v. North Carolina, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981).
355 Upon discovering the Brady information, postconviction counsel filed a
motion seeking a new trial. After a hearing, the trial judge granted the motion. State v.
McDowell, 310 S.E.2d 301, 303-05 (N.C. 1984). The state Supreme Court reversed. Id.
at 303. On federal habeas, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
ordered relief on that claim. Dixon, 858 F.2d at 951. Although McDowell’s case appears
to be missing from a 2006 assessment of Fourth Circuit habeas decisions, he is among a
small minority of petitioners to prevail in a Circuit whose rates of habeas relief are
“significantly lower than in any other circuit.” Sheri Lynn Johnson, Wishing Petitioners
to Death: Factual Misrepresentations in Fourth Circuit Capital Cases, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 1105, 1150-51 & nn.373-79 (2006).
348
349
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received a new trial and a conviction on the lesser, noncapital
charge of second-degree murder.356
Thus, full open file discovery reform began as a political
compromise inspired by protracted litigation over due process
disclosure duties. A coalition (or at least a collection) of odd
bedfellows designed full open file reform in part to reduce the
wasted resources and uncertainty created in cases like Robert
McDowell’s by nondisclosure of Brady evidence to the defense.
The new open file statute “changed the landscape” of capital
postconviction litigation.357 As discussed below, the state courts
rejected the few challenges that prosecutors raised in the early
phases of implementation. Instead, the legislature addressed
prosecutors’ concerns by amending the statutes. And the
general trajectory of the amendments has been toward
expanding and strengthening open file rights and duties.
C.

Full Open File Reform in Action: Case Law, Legislative
History, and a View from the Trenches

The state Supreme Court issued the first significant
interpretation of the 1996 full open file discovery statute within
two years of enactment. The state had sought to restrict the
law’s scope by labeling the bulk of the prosecution’s file “work
product.”358 The Court applied the law’s plain language and
rejected the state’s argument.359 Then compliance with the 1996
statute revealed Brady violations in a series of capital cases.
The state courts vacated judgments in ten of those cases.360
That litigation focused attention on noncompliance with Brady
discovery duties and the resulting burdens on courts, victims’
356 McDowell received a life sentence. Persons Removed from Death Row Since
North Carolina’s Death Penalty Was Reinstated in 1977, N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY,
http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dop/deathpenalty/removed.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
357 Mosteller, supra note 5, at 263.
358 Id. at 263 & n.17 (citing State v. Bates, 497 S.E.2d 276, 280 (N.C. 1998)).
359 Bates, 497 S.E.2d at 280-82.
360 Mosteller, supra note 5, at 261 & n.11 (citing cases). Brady claims led to
new trials in these cases only after significant expenditure of time and resources on
direct appeal, during which the office of the state Attorney General represented the
prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Gell, 524 S.E.2d 332 (N.C. 2000) (new trial awarded on
post-conviction Motion for Appropriate Relief, Bertie County Superior Court Docket
No. 95 CRS 1884, Dec. 9, 2002); State v. Hamilton, 519 S.E.2d 514 (N.C. 1999) (same,
Richmond County Superior Court Docket No. 95 CRS 1670, Apr. 23, 2003); State v.
Hoffman, 505 S.E.2d 80 (N.C. 1998) (same, Union County Superior Court Docket No.
95 CRS 15695, Apr. 30, 2004); State v. Bishop, 472 S.E.2d 842 (N.C. 1996) (same,
Guilford County Superior Court Docket Nos. 93 CRS 20410-20423, Jan. 10, 2000);
State v. Womble, 473 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. 1996) (same, Columbus County Superior Court
Docket Nos. 93 CRS 1992-1993).

1380

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:4

families, taxpayers, defendants, and public confidence in the
criminal justice system.
By this point, about half of the state prosecutors had
implemented some form of open file discovery.361 Subsequent
media coverage and public pressure led to the first major
expansion of the 1996 full open file statute in 2004.362 That
amendment created the broadest criminal discovery rights and
duties in the nation.363 As discussed below, subsequent
amendments in 2007 and 2011 continued the trajectory toward
increasingly expansive and enforceable discovery duties.
The 2004 statute extended discovery duties beyond the
postconviction phase, requiring the prosecution in all felony
cases to provide the defense, before trial, with “the complete files
of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the
investigation . . . or prosecution” of the case.364 File was defined
expansively as well, to include all statements by defendants,
codefendants, and witnesses, all investigative notes, all test or
examination results, and “any other matter or evidence obtained
during the investigation” of the case.365 Crucially, the statute
mandated that “[o]ral statements shall be in written or recorded
form”366 and shielded prosecutors’ interview notes from
disclosure as work product only “to the extent they contain the
opinions, theories, strategies or conclusions” of the prosecutor or
other legal staff.367 Another provision allowed both prosecution
and defense to move ex parte for protective orders to prevent
disclosures that create “a substantial risk to any person of
physical harm, intimidation, bribery, economic reprisals, or
unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment.”368
In April 2007, the state’s intermediate court of appeals
interpreted the crucial provision requiring recordation and
disclosure of all oral statements. As was the case with the 1996
361 Telephone Interview with Kimberly Overton, Chief Resource Prosecutor,
N.C. Conference of District Attorneys (Aug. 17, 2011).
362 Mosteller, supra note 5, at 264-76. Discontent over the perceived mildness
of sanctions for nondisclosure also led to expanded duties under the governing
disciplinary rules. Id.
363 Id. at 274-76.
364 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2004).
365 Id.
366 Id.
367 Id. § 15A-904(a).
368 Id. § 15A-908(a). The new provision for ex parte protective orders required
notice to opposing counsel of the order’s existence, but “without disclosure of the
subject matter.” Id. A subsequent amendment requires any “affidavits or statements”
supporting such an ex parte order to be sealed for appellate review. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-908(b) (2012).
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discovery statute, the Court again held that the legislature
meant what it said: “The plain, unambiguous meaning of this
requirement is that ‘statements’ need not be signed or adopted
before being subject to discovery.”369 The panel majority also
rejected the state’s objection that the requirement to reveal all
recorded witness statements trenched too far upon work
product privileges. The Court held that the amendment
adequately protects prosecutors’ “mental processes while
allowing the defendants access to factual information collected
by the state.”370
Like the state courts, the legislature also rejected an
attempt by prosecutors to expand the work-product privilege in
the discovery reform statutes.371 But prosecutors did obtain
amendments addressing other concerns. At the prosecutors’
request, protections were added to shield personal identifying
information and, more specifically, to protect identities of
confidential informants.372 The legislature also eased
requirements for recording witness statements to prevent
redundancies.373
Other amendments responded to a DNA laboratory’s
failure to reveal exculpatory information in the Duke lacrosse

State v. Shannon, 642 S.E.2d 516, 523 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 525 n.2 (quoting John Rubin, N.C. Inst. of Gov’t, Administration of
Justice, BULL. 2004/06, at 8); State v. Hardy, 235 S.E.2d 828, 841 (N.C. 1977) (“Only
roughly and broadly speaking can a statement of a witness that is reduced verbatim to
a writing or a recording by an attorney be considered work product, if at all . . . . Such a
statement is not work product in the same sense that an attorney’s impressions,
opinions, and conclusions or his legal theories and strategies are work product.”).
371 The General Assembly rejected a 2007 amendment that would have reduced
prosecutors’ duty to disclose interview notes. Compare N.C.S.B. 1009, 2007 Gen. Assemb.
(N.C. Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2007/Bills/Senate/
PDF/S1009v1.pdf, with Act of Aug. 19, 2007, § 15A-904(a), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 377 § 2,
available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2007/Bills/Senate/PDF/S1009v4.pdf. The
legislature also rejected a 2011 amendment to limit prosecutors’ disclosure duties to their
own files as opposed to all investigative materials held by all agencies involved in the case.
Compare N.C.H.B. 408, 2011 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. Mar. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2011/Bills/House/PDF/H408v1.pdf, with N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2012).
372 § 15A-904(a)(1)-(2), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 377 § 2. These protections were
later expanded to include specific categories of confidential informants and victim
impact statements. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-904(a3)-(a4) (2012).
373 § 15A-903(a)(1), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 377 § 1. The amendment eliminated
the recordation requirement when prosecutors interview a witness without a third
party present unless the witness says something “significantly new or different” from
prior recorded statements. Id. The Shannon dissent had noted the inefficiencies
resulting from the previous double-recordation requirement. 642 S.E.2d at 524, 526
(McCullough, J., dissenting in part). After obtaining agreement on the 2007
amendments, the state dropped its appeal of the Shannon majority’s decision. State v.
Shannon, 654 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. 2007).
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cases374 and to new concerns raised by both prosecutors and
defense lawyers. Prosecutors protested that unwarranted
disciplinary charges were being filed against them when other
agencies hindered compliance by failing to give prosecutors the
information they needed to satisfy their discovery duties.375 In
response, the legislature redefined the term prosecutorial
agencies to accommodate prosecutors’ limited ability to
sanction nondisclosure by investigators. But the amendments
also expanded the statutes’ scope. Agencies was redefined to
include “any public or private entity that obtains information
on behalf of a law enforcement agency or prosecutor’s office in
connection with the investigation . . . or prosecution” of a
case.376 The legislature also clarified that all testing data must
be disclosed, “including, but not limited to, preliminary tests or
screening results and bench notes.”377
In addition, these recent amendments tightened the
mandate for disclosure by law enforcement or other
investigative agencies of the complete investigative file to the
prosecution.378 The legislature added criminal penalties for
willful noncompliance with disclosure duties by investigative
agencies.379 Finally, the revised statutes require that a
prosecutor’s “reasonably diligent inquiry” to comply with
disclosure duties triggers a presumption that he or she acted in
good faith.380 The Governor signed these amendments into law
on June 23, 2011.381
The well-known Duke lacrosse case demonstrates that
full open file discovery is a prerequisite—a necessary, if not a
sufficient, condition—for preventing Brady violations as well as
the wasteful litigation and wrongful prosecutions and
See Mosteller, supra note 5, at 285-306.
See N.C. H.B. 408, Bill Tracking Report, 2011 Bill Tracking N.C. H.B. 408,
[hereinafter H.B. 408 Bill Tracking Report] (bill “avoids frivolous claims of professional
misconduct against prosecutors”); see also Telephone Interview with Brad Bannon, N.C.
Advocates for Justice (June 27, 2011); Telephone Interviews with Professors Jim
Drennan, Jeff Welty, and Jessica Smith, N.C. Sch. of Gov’t (July 27, 2011; July 31,
2011; and Aug. 1, 2011, respectively); Telephone Interview with Kimberly Overton,
supra note 361.
376 Act of June 23, 2011, § 15A-903(a)(1)(c), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 250, § 1,
available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2011/Bills/House/PDF/H408v5.pdf.
377 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1)(a) (2012).
378 Compare Act of July 5, 2007, § 15A-903(c), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 183, § 1,
available
at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2007/Bills/House/PDF/H786v5.pdf
(requiring disclosure upon request by the State), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 903(c) (mandating
timely disclosure without request).
379 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(d).
380 Id. § 15A-910(c)-(d).
381 H.B. 408 Bill Tracking Report, supra note 375.
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convictions that can ensue.382 Additional evidence of full open
file discovery’s success includes the rarity of court challenges or
other significant litigation arising from the statutes in the
reported cases; the judiciary’s plain-language resolution of
those claims; and the legislature’s accommodation of
prosecutors’ concerns as they arise while maintaining and
strengthening full open file rights and duties.
Observations from those involved with training and
implementation indicate that after initial resistance, primarily
from some of the more experienced prosecutors and law
enforcement officers, full open file reform is finding increasingly
broad acceptance.383 Under the statutes, responsibility for
identifying materially beneficial information is where it
belongs—with defense counsel. Full open file discovery appears
to be increasing the speed and fairness of plea bargaining.384 An
initial surge in pretrial protective orders subsided with
amendments shielding victims and witnesses from inappropriate
exposure or interference.385 Some jurisdictions have seen
increased pretrial discovery hearings, mainly in high-level cases,
as the parties document good-faith efforts to comply with their
statutory duties.386 Issues regarding appropriate sanctions for
discovery violations by both sides are being resolved through
the normal course of trial rulings and appellate review.387
On the other hand, logistical problems with discovery
production have been significant, particularly in major cases
with deep investigative histories. Some of these concerns are
being addressed through training on best practices and
through development of an electronic compliance program.388
This Discovery Automated System, when fully operational, will
be used by investigative agencies, prosecutors, and defenders,
respectively, to record, organize, and receive information.
Every action in a case will be recorded, and date-stamped. Such

Mosteller, supra note 5, at 276-309.
Telephone Interviews with Brad Bannon and Professors Jim Drennan, Jeff
Welty, and Jessica Smith, supra note 375; Telephone Interview with Kimberly
Overton, supra note 361.
384 See sources cited supra note 383.
385 See sources cited supra note 383.
386 See sources cited supra note 383.
387 JESSICA SMITH, CRIMINAL CASE COMPENDIUM 25-27 (University of North
Carolina Institute of Government, Aug. 2, 2011) (collecting cases), available at
http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/Criminal%20Case%20Compendium
%20November%202008%20to%20present.pdf.
388 See sources cited supra note 383.
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recordation will include any redactions or edits made to any of
the information contained in the file.389
Certainly there remain key sticking points for successful
implementation of full open file reform. Thousands of new and
experienced investigators must be trained. These front-line
justice system personnel range from law enforcement officers to
employees in the state Department of Social Services. Nor will
it suffice merely to train these key stakeholders on the scope
and meaning of full open file rights and duties. Investigators
also must have adequate resources to comply with recordation
and reporting requirements. Finally, as Daniel Medwed,
R. Michael Cassidy, and other scholars have noted, full open file
discovery is not a cure-all.390 The recent removal of Durham,
North Carolina District Attorney Tracy Cline from office was
due in part to discovery violations that underscore the
recalcitrance of some agency cultures, and of corresponding
enforceability problems, related to prosecutors’ discovery
duties.391 Nevertheless, when compliance can be enforced
through criminal penalties, and when robust opportunities for
defense investigation and litigation at the trial, appellate, and
postconviction stages create a meaningful opportunity to prevent
or promptly detect and correct discovery violations, the full open
file model is the best option for improving efficiency, reliability,
and fairness in criminal adjudications.
D.

Research and Reform Opportunities for the Future

Although much work remains to be done to improve
compliance with criminal discovery obligations, the readily
available empirical evidence highlights significant steps toward
successful implementation of full open file discovery as a reform
model. The history of full open file reform also demonstrates the
See sources cited supra note 383.
Cassidy, supra note 37, at 1477; Medwed, supra note 98, at 1557-66.
391 Cline replaced Michael Nifong, the prosecutor in the Duke lacrosse cases. J.
Andrew Curliss, Judge Takes Cline to Task, NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Nov. 15, 2011, 4:08 AM),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/11/15/1645167/judge-takes-cline-to-task.html.
Cline’s
subsequent suspension and removal were triggered under a seldom-used state statute, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-66 (2011). J. Andrew Curliss, Cline Inquiry Hangs on “Elastic” Law,
NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Feb. 12, 2012, 3:38 AM), http://www.newsobserver.com/
2012/02/12/1847876/cline-inquiry-hangs-on-elastic.html; Group Claims Durham DA
Unfairly Removed From Office, NEWSRECORD.COM (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.newsrecord.com/content/2012/03/21/article/group_claims_durham_da_unfairly_removed_from_off
ice; see also In re Hudson, 600 S.E.2d 25, 27-28 (N.C. 2004) (affirming order dismissing
removal petition and sanctioning party moving for prosecutor’s removal); In re Spivey, 480
S.E.2d 693, 701 (N.C. 1997) (rejecting prosecutor’s challenge to statute based on state
constitutional separation of powers grounds).
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continued vitality of litigation and legislation as necessary
complements to internal agency reform in the context of
discretionary prosecutorial decision making. Additional research
should test for any influence of full open file discovery reform on
plea and conviction rates and pretrial or postconviction
litigation over discovery issues. Further research should also
identify the conditions that foster such reform in some
jurisdictions and impede it in others. With respect to North
Carolina’s expansion of full open file discovery from capital
postconviction cases to all felonies, Professor Mosteller
summarizes the accomplishment in half-a-dozen words: “The
adversaries hammered out a deal.”392
That statement raises interesting questions. What
conditions enabled the defense function, whose efficacy is often
strongly discounted,393 to come to the negotiating table as a
meaningful adversary to the prosecution? How might those
conditions be duplicated in other jurisdictions? To what extent
did the adversaries channel the interests of the
disproportionately low income and minority individuals who
bear the brunt of crime and criminal proceedings, but who,
according to popular wisdom, are excluded from meaningful
participation in the development of criminal justice policy?394
What conditions enable those same individuals to ask their
own policy questions, build their own coalitions and advocate
for their own solutions to what are too often perceived as
“criminal injustice systems”?395
Answering such questions could help move justice
systems more quickly toward greater fairness and finality in
criminal adjudications. With respect to the most recent set of
full open file amendments, key negotiators for the prosecution
and the defense concur that two skills were essential to
successful resolution of the issues. First, the negotiators were
able to defuse emotions inherent in the highly adversarial
prosecutor-defender relationship.396 Second, they were able to
listen closely to opposing views to detect and address the core
concerns being brought to the table.397 Combining those
Mosteller, supra note 5, at 272 & n.76.
See generally CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 113.
394 See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
395 Judge Weinstein captured the reality behind this epithet with passionate
precision in United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 660 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
396 Telephone Interviews with Brad Bannon and Professors Jim Drennan, Jeff
Welty, and Jessica Smith, supra note 375; Telephone Interview with Kimberly
Overton, supra note 361.
397 Id.
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capacities allowed negotiators to tailor solutions to the specific
problems at issue, and to build trust essential to the resolution
of future problems.398 As I have discussed in a different
doctrinal context, such capacities are central to the exercise of
moral imagination within a discourse model of political
ethics.399 Ideally, they will be brought to bear at the national
level, through exploration of the full open file statutes as a
model for a uniform criminal discovery code encompassing
misdemeanors as well as felonies.400
In the absence of such conditions, other “carrot-andstick” options might be considered. The “stick” component could
emulate federal legislation adopted after the Rampart police
misconduct scandal exploded in Los Angeles. In response,
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which opened the door for
Department of Justice oversight of local police reform efforts
initiated through litigation.401 Ironically, it was in the context of
public outrage over the Rampart scandal that Richard Ceballos
felt bound to report evidence of officer perjury in the Cuskey
and Longoria cases.402 Similar outrage over injustices and
inefficiencies caused by Brady’s weak enforceability might lead
to comparable legislation, oversight, and reform in the arena of
prosecutorial disclosure duties. Reform advocates also might
seek to tie the receipt of federal and other grant funding to the
achievement of benchmarks in progress toward full open file
reform. The “carrot” approach to reform has some track record
of success in the context of policing, and might translate well in
bringing appropriate levels of transparency and accountability
to discretionary prosecutorial decision making.403
Id.
See generally Janet Moore, Covenant and Feminist Reconstructions of
Subjectivity Within Theories of Justice, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (1992).
400 See supra note 30.
401 Chemerinsky, supra note 226, at 589-97; Kami Chavis Simmons, The
Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local
Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 507-11 (2008).
402 See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
403 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & AUSTIN D. SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL
CRIME POLICY AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, 1968-78, at 4
(1980) (noting that legislation that created LEAA adopted a block grant approach, in
which fighting crime would remain a state and local function, and federal government’s
primary role would be to provide revenues and ideas allowing states to develop
programs for their own use); NANCY E. MARION, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL CRIME
CONTROL INITIATIVES, 1960-93, at 56-58 (1994) (noting LEAA’s block grant design was
supported by Republicans and Southern Democrats in Congress, who felt that federal
government should not involve itself directly in local police efforts); Paul Hoffman, The
Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police
Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1530-31 nn.296-97 (1993) (urging
conditional grants of federal funds to curb police misconduct).
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CONCLUSION
The implementation and expansion of full open file
discovery provides two object lessons. First, the model’s
successes to date offer lessons for jurisdictions seeking greater
fairness, finality, and efficiency in criminal case outcomes.
Second, full open file reform demonstrates the continued
vitality of law and politics as effective and quintessentially
democratic tools for opening the black boxes that nest
throughout the nation’s criminal justice systems. Connick and
Garcetti can introduce an important new chapter in this reform
process. The cases simultaneously underscore the weak
enforceability of prosecutors’ due process disclosure duties and
highlight the benefits of the full open file discovery model.
The core question animating this work is a search for
sustainable production of the conditions that allow jurisdictions
to pursue, through the traditional clash of law and politics as
necessary complements to internal agency reform, significant
“smart on crime” improvements such as full open file discovery.
For example, Miller and Wright correctly stress the critical role
of internal data gathering and assessment in identifying and
correcting race effects on prosecutorial decision making.404 Yet
it was zealous litigation and aggressive, grassroots-to-grasstops
political advocacy that led to enactment of the nation’s first
Racial Justice Act, allowing death row inmates to challenge
death sentences based on statistical evidence of unconscious
racial bias in charging, sentencing, and jury selection.405
Litigation and policy advocacy also has motivated key indigent
defense reforms, including the creation of politically
independent oversight bodies with the authority to promulgate
and enforce standards for attorney qualification, training, and

Miller & Wright, supra note 29, at 195.
North Carolina Racial Justice Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2010 to -2012
(2012). On April 20, 2012, Judge Gregory Weeks ordered relief in the first case litigated
under the Racial Justice Act. State v. Robinson, No. 91-CrS-23143 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Apr. 20, 2012). Two months later the legislature overrode a gubernatorial veto and
repealed significant provisions of the Act. An Act to Amend Death Penalty Procedure,
2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, §§ 2-9, (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A2004(b), 15A-2011 to -2012. For an analysis of the legal and political history that led to
the Racial Justice Act, see generally Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The Racial
Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina,
88 N.C. L. REV. 2031 (2010); for analysis of the statutes’ application, see Robert P.
Mosteller, Responding to McCleskey and the Defects of Batson: North Carolina Racial
Justice Act Addresses the Systemic Pattern of Race Based Peremptory Challenges in
Death Sentences, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2012).
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performance.406 In a like vein, crises in state and local budgets
have led legislatures to accompany new criminal justice
statutes with fiscal note and racial impact assessment
requirements. Such benchmarks can help check the massive
and virtually unregulated investment of increasingly scarce tax
dollars407 in what too often becomes a rapidly-spinning set of
revolving doors into and out of local, state, and national
criminal justice systems.408
The complementary nature of bureaucracy, law, and
politics warrants more scholarly analysis at these and other
pivot points in the discretionary decision making that drives
criminal justice systems. Legal scholars can enrich the analysis
through interdisciplinary cooperation with specialists in
criminology, sociology, political science, public health, and
social work. Inter-institutional partnerships between the legal
academy and government, nonprofit agencies, and foundations
may yield more effective, sustainable system improvements.
Such engaged scholarship may also offer an antidote for
despair over the possibility of truly democratic criminal justice
reform. This is the political black box that can tempt scholars
to privilege internal administrative reform over law and
politics in the quest for criminal justice reform. Engaged
scholarship may be able to empower the disproportionately
low-income and minority members of our communities—those
whose lives most often intersect with criminal justice systems,
but who seldom have an effective voice in shaping policy and
procedure—to pose their own research questions, formulate
their own reform proposals, and create their own policy
advocacy coalitions. Their voices are crucial to sustaining the
quest for greater transparency and accountability in criminal
justice decision making.

406 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-102 (2005); Bruce A. Green, Criminal
Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1183 &
n.65 (2003) (citing Montana litigation).
407 See STEVE AOS ET AL., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, EVIDENCEBASED PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE COSTS, AND CRIME RATES (2006); Catherine London, Racial Impact
Statements: A Proactive Approach to Addressing Racial Disparities in Prison
Populations, 29 LAW & INEQ. 211, 231-33 & nn.178-91 (2011) (describing effects of
fiscal and racial impact note requirements).
408 See generally Alexander, supra note 343.

